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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
The Airline Transportation System (ATS) provides affordable, rapid, safe transportation to distant 
and/or remote destinations.  
Airlines maximize profit by leveraging economies-of-scale to schedule passenger itineraries in time 
and space to meet the passenger demand for travel. The choice of routes served, schedule, and aircraft 
type used, determines the ability of the airlines to operate profitably. As passenger demand for air 
transportation service fluctuates, the airlines are obliged to continuously adjust their operations, resulting 
in dynamics in markets served, schedules, and aircraft used. 
Estimates of the benefits of modernization efforts, such as the Airport Improvement Plan (AIP) and 
NextGen, are limited by existing analysis tools that assume a static airline service (i.e. fleet, route, and 
schedule) and do not consider the airline response to the introduction of additional capacity, new 
concepts-of-operations, and new technologies. 
This report describes the Airline Fleet, Route, and Schedule Optimization Model (AFRS-OM) that is 
designed to provide insights into airline decision-making with regards to markets served, schedule of 
flights on these markets, the type of aircraft assigned to each scheduled flight, load factors, airfares, and 
airline profits. The main inputs to the model are hedged fuel prices, airport capacity limits, candidate 
markets. Embedded in the model are aircraft performance and associated cost factors, and willingness-to-
pay (i.e. demand vs. airfare curves). 
This model is based on the research of Le (2005) and Ferguson (2011). New features of the model 
described in this report include cumulative willingness-to-pay (i.e. demand) curves for 15 minute 
increments for U.S. domestic origin-destination pairs, and a model to adjust the willingness-to-pay curves 
that accounts for changes in hedged fuel prices and unemployment rates (a proxy for overall economic 
health). The model has been validated by comparing trends (i.e. growth or decay) with historic data and 
exhibits accuracy in the 10% to 15% range. 
Case studies demonstrate the application of the model for analysis of the effects of increased capacity 
and changes in operating costs (e.g. fuel prices).  
An increase in capacity at eight major airports (BOS, DFW, EWR, JFK, LGA, ORD, PHL, SFO) 
yields increases in the number of markets served and the flights per day. This is accompanied by a small 
increase in airline profits, and a slight decrease in airfares making air travel more affordable. Increases in 
airport capacity do, however, result in a slight reduction in airport/airspace slot efficiency, as airlines 
choose to use smaller aircraft. 
An increase in hedged fuel prices at eight major airports (BOS, DFW, EWR, JFK, LGA, ORD, PHL, 
SFO) yields reductions in the number of markets served and the flights per day. This is accompanied by a 
marginal increase in airline profits, and an increase in airfares. An increase in fuel prices results in a 
reduction in airport/airspace slot efficiency as airlines choose to use smaller aircraft. 
Although there are differences between airports (due to differences in the magnitude of travel demand 
and sensitivity to airfare), the system is more sensitive to changes in fuel prices than capacity. Further, the 
benefits of modernization in the form of increased capacity could be undermined by increases in hedged 
fuel prices. 
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1 INTRODUCTION 
The Airline Transportation System (ATS) provides affordable, rapid, safe transportation to passengers 
and cargo to distant and/or remote destinations. In terms of speed and cost for transportation of relatively 
small and lightweight items, this mode of transportation has unassailable advantages over other modes of 
transportation over long distances. 
Airlines maximize profit by scheduling passenger itineraries in time and space to meet passenger 
demand for travel. To minimize costs and maximize the utilization of assets, airlines take advantages of 
economies-of-scale and schedule flights in a space-time network whereby passenger itineraries are 
satisfied by one or more flights, and the aircraft and crew are positioned to transport the next batch of 
passengers on the next leg of their itineraries. The choice of routes served, schedule, and aircraft type 
used directly determines the ability of the airlines to operate profitably. As passenger demand for air 
transportation service fluctuates, the airlines are obliged to continuously adjust their operations.  
These airline decisions have broad implications on the overall structure of the ATS from an economic, 
social and political standpoint (Figure 1). The number of markets served determines the geographic 
availability of transportation (e.g. rural areas). The airfare determines the affordability of air travel. 
Airline profit determines the viability in operating an unsubsidized service. Aircraft size determines the 
efficiency in using airport/airspace slots to transport passengers. 
 
 
Figure 1: Understanding of the effects of modernization on the overall transportation 
system: economic, social, and political 
Due to limitations in available land, funding, long investment and approval cycles, and political will, 
the capacity to support the demand at the largest metropolitan regions in a reliable manner has degraded 
over time. Recent reports have estimated the cost of poor reliability of the ATS for 2007 at $32B 
(NEXTOR, 2010) and $42B (Schumer Report, 2010). 
Government and industry have partnered to develop plans to increase the capacity. The Airport 
Investment Plan (AIP, 2010) provides a roadmap for increasing airport infrastructure. NextGen, 
coordinated by the Joint Planning and Development Office (JPDO), has developed a roadmap to improve 
the productivity of the system by utilizing existing resources more effectively through new concepts-of-
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operations and technologies (JPDO, 2010). 
Estimating the benefits of the overall modernization effort are limited by existing analysis tools that 
treat the airline service (i.e. fleet, route, and schedule) as static and do not consider the airline response to 
the introduction of additional capacity, new concepts-of-operations, and new technologies, on the 
economic, social and political decision-space (Figure 1). 
This report describes the Airline Fleet, Route, and Schedule Optimization Model (AFRS-OM). The 
AFRS-OM is designed to provide insights into the airline decision-making with regards to markets 
served, schedule of flights on these markets, the type of aircraft assigned to each scheduled flight, load 
factors, airfares, and airline profits. The main inputs to the model are hedged fuel prices, airport capacity 
limits, and candidate markets. Embedded in the model are aircraft performance and associated cost factors 
and willingness-to-pay (i.e. demand vs. airfare curves). 
This model is based on the research of Le (2005) and Ferguson (2011). New features of the model 
described in this paper include cumulative willingess-to-pay (i.e. demand) curves for 15 minute 
increments for most U.S. domestic origin-destination pairs, and model to adjust the willingness-to-pay 
curves to account for changes in hedged fuel prices and unemployment rates (a proxy for overall 
economic health). The model has been validated by comparing trends (i.e. growth or decay) with historic 
data and exhibits accuracy in the 10% to 15% range. 
Case studies demonstrate the application of the model for analysis of the effects of increased capacity 
and changes in fuel prices. The highlights of the case-studies described in this report are shown in Table 
1.  
 Metrics 
Effect of Increase 
+$1/gallon Effect of Increase in +4 ops/hour 
Flights per Day -1.4% 0.05% 
Markets Served -1.1% Unchanged 
Pax Trips per Day -8.7% +0.05% 
Average Airfare ($) +$34 +0.006% 
Airline Profits ($M) +3.2% +0.12% 
Average Aircraft Size (Seats per Aircraft) -7.5% +0.024% 
Daily Fuel Burn (M gallons) -8.3% +0.014% 
Table 1: Percent change due to increase in capacity at airports and increase in hedged fuel 
price 
An increase in capacity at eight major airports (BOS, DFW, EWR, JFK, LGA, ORD, PHL, SFO)) 
yields increases in the number of markets served and the flights per day. This is accompanied by a small 
increase in airline profits, a slight decrease in airfares, and a slight reduction in runway slot efficiency 
through use of smaller aircraft. 
 
An increase in hedged fuel prices at eight major airports (BOS, DFW, EWR, JFK, LGA, ORD, PHL, 
SFO) yields reductions in the number of markets served and the flights per day. This is accompanied by a 
marginal increase in airline profits, an increase in airfares, and slight reduction in runway slot efficiency 
through use of smaller aircraft. 
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Although there are differences between individual airports (due to differences in the magnitude of travel 
demand and sensitivity to airfare), on aggregate the ATS is more sensitive to changes in fuel prices than 
capacity increases. Further, the benefits of modernization on geographic access (i.e. markets served) and 
economic access (i.e. affordability of travel) could be undermined by increases in hedged fuel prices. In 
both cases, capacity increase and fuel price increase, the efficiency of the air transportation system is 
degraded by the use of smaller aircraft. 
 
The remainder of this report is organized as follows: Section 2 provides a detailed description of the 
AFRS-OM. Section 3 describes validation and limitations of the model. Section 4 describes a case-study 
of metroplex airports. Appendix A includes a Flight Delay Cost model. 
 
2 AIRLINE FLEET, ROUTE AND SCHEDULE OPTIMZATION 
MODEL (AFRS-OM) 
The AFRS-OM is a multi-commodity model to optimize the domestic non-stop airline service to an 
airport in the presence of travel demand with associated sensitivity to airfares, a fleet mix with associated 
aircraft performance characteristics, and limitations of capacity at the focus airport (Le, 2006; Ferguson, 
2011).  
The main ouputs of the model are; 
 markets served 
 schedule of flights on these markets 
 the type of aircraft assigned to each scheduled flight 
 load factors 
 airfares 
 airline profits, revenues, and costs 
 total fuel burn 
 
The main inputs to the model are: 
 hedged fuel prices 
 airport capacity limits (adjusted for international flights with bi-lateral agreements and reserved 
general aviation slots) 
 candidate markets 
 
Embedded in the model are detailed models of: 
 aircraft performance and associated cost factors 
 willingness-to-pay (i.e. demand vs. airfare curves) for domestic U.S. origin-destination pairs 
 effect of hedged fuel prices and unemployment (a proxy of economic health) on the willingess-to-
pay-curves 
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The structure and components of the model are are summarized in
 
 
Figure 2. The optimization model includes a master problem and sub-problem. The sub-problem selects 
the most desirable schedule and fleet for individual origin-destination pairs (e.g. Atlanta to Boston) for 
each 15 minute period of the day. The preferred schedules for each origin-destination pair are submitted 
to the master problem that selects the most profitable flights for each 15 minute period. The shadow price 
information (i.e. value of an additional flight within any 15 minute time period) are fed back to the sub-
problem for adjustment of the schedule and fleet for each individual origin-destination pair. The sub-
problem/master problem iteration continues until the “stable” criteria are satisfied. 
 
The model includes detailed models of aircraft performance and associated cost factors, “baseline” 
willingess-to-pay curves for domestic U.S. origin-destination pairs, and a model that adjusts the baseline 
willingness-to-pay curves for changes in hedged fuel prices and unemployment. Each of these 
components and the format of the inputs and outputs are described in the following sections. 
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Figure 2: Structure and components of the AFSR-OM 
 
 
2.1 Master Problem 
The master problem is formulated as a set packing problem for the candidate market schedules generated 
by the sub-problem. The optimization is constrained by airport capacity, with no more than one schedule 
chosen per market. The objective function maximizes total profit for the airport’s schedule. 
 
 
 
The optimization formulation is as follows: 
 
        
   
 
subject to: 
 
 
      
   
       
         (1) 
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 (3) 
         
where: 
Zj = Profit from schedule j 
yj = Decision variable (0,1) on whether schedule j is selected 
aij = Decision variable (0,1) on arrival for time i and schedule j 
dij = Decision variable (0,1) on departure for time i and schedule j 
Ij = average number of international or cargo arrivals (a) or departures (d) for time i 
τ= Set of 15 minute time windows in the day 
S = Set of schedules submitted to master problem from sub problems 
S(m)= Set of schedules for market m 
M = Set of possible markets for schedule 
Constraint #1 and #2 ensure that there are no more flights in a single 15-minute bin than the arrival and 
departure capacity available to handle these flights, respectively. Capacity is defined to be airport capacity 
minus the portion of that capacity used by other flights (e.g. international and general aviaton).  
Constraint #3 guarantees that at most only one schedule per market pair is chosen. 
 
2.2 Sub-Problem 
The sub-problem is formulated as a multi-commodity flow netwok problem. The optimization 
formulation is shown below: 
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where: 
Riq= Linear segment revenue for time i and segment q 
λiq = Decision variable (0,1) for time i and segment q 
Ckij= Direct operating cost for one flight of fleet type k for flight arc (i,j) 
xkij= Decision variable (0,1) for one flight of fleet type k for flight arc (i,j) 
l = average load factor 
Sk = Seats for aircraft of fleet type k 
Aiq = Linear segment passenger demand for time i and segment q 
Apr = Linear segment passenger demand for period r and segment p 
Rpr = Linear segment revenue for period r and segment p 
βpr = Decision variable (0,1) for period r and segment p 
τ = Set of 15 minute time windows in the day 
ρ = Set of periods in the day 
κ = Set of aircraft fleet classes 
 
The objective function maximizes total profit for the markets schedule from the airport. There are 10 
constraints numbered 4 through 13. 
 
Constraint #4 creates flow balance constraints that assure that, for each fleet type, there is an equal 
number of incoming and outgoing aircraft of that type.  It also assures that an aircraft must arrive before it 
can depart and it must remain of the same type.  
 
Constraint #5 assures that there is sufficient supply for the demand, that the aircraft size can 
accommodate the demand, and that the aircraft does not fly with less than 80% load factor.   
 
Constraint #6 requires that the demand per period be satisfied.  
 
Constraint #7 assures that the airline does not fly any flights that are unprofitable.  This does the same for 
revenue. This is to ensure that even though there is no flight at some time window despite there being 
demand for it, the demand is still satisfied in the consecutive time window and passengers are not 
removed from that time period.  
 
Constraint set #8 requires the number of flights into a market is approximately equal to the number of 
flights out of a market (can differ by no more than one).  
 
Constraint #9 ensures that international passenger demand that is connecting from domestic markets is 
satisfied.  Therefore, we will not eliminate a profitable market which connects domestic passengers to 
international flights. 
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Constraints #10 and #11 ensure that there is only one flight between the market pair in the same time 
window.   
 
Constraint #12 and #13 ensures that only one segment of the piecewise linear approximation for the 
revenue curve is chosen for each time window and period respectively.  The piecewise linear 
approximation works here because the optimization model is maximizing profit and the revenue versus 
demand curve approximations are convex. 
 
2.3 Flight Profit Model 
The profit for a given flight is defined as the difference between Revenue and Operating Costs. 
 
Profit = Revenue – Operating Cost 
 
Revenue for a flight is the number of passengers multiplied by the average airfare. 
 
Revenue = Number of Passengers * Average Airfare 
 
Operating Cost is defined by the summation of two terms: (1) the non-fuel hourly operating costs 
multiplied by the block hours, (2) the hourly fuel burn rate multipled by the hedge price of fuel multiplied 
by the block hours.  
 
Operating Cost = ( Block Hours * Non-fuel Hourly Operating Costs ) + (Block Hours * Hedged Fuel 
Price * Hourly Fuel Burn Rate. 
Each of the terms in these equations are described in subsequent sections. 
 
2.4 Airfare Model 
The airfare model is a scheme to derive accurate airfare statistics from publicly available data. The model 
developed by Ferguson (2011) adjusts airfare to account for the fees and taxes included in the airfares 
reported in the BTS DB1B “Market” database. 
 
The domestic taxes and fees not included in the DB1B consist of passenger ticket taxes, flight segment 
taxes, and passenger facility charges. The amount a passenger pays in taxes and fees on a ticket varies 
according to the itinerary, including the number of flights on each itinerary, and the origin and destination 
airports. The passenger ticket taxes for the period under investigation were 7.5% of the ticket airfare and 
the domestic flight segment tax was set at $3.60 as of January 2009 (ATA 2011). 
 
The Passenger Facility Charges (PFC) for major airports allows for the collection of PFC fees up to $4.50 
for every enplaned passenger at commercial airports controlled by public agencies (FAA 2011). These 
funds are used by the airports to fund the FAA-approved projects to enhance safety, security, or capacity, 
reduce noise, or increase air carrier competition. The average PFCs for the airports examined in this study 
were $3.63. 
 
The airlines also include a “September 11” security fee in the airfare reported in the DB1B.  This fee is 
imposed on passengers of domestic and foreign air carriers for air transportation that originates at airports 
in the United States. The fee, which is collected at the time the ticket is bought, is $2.50 per enplanement 
and is imposed on not more than two enplanements per one-way trip. The fees are collected by the direct 
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air carriers, who must remit the fees to the Transportation Security Administration on a monthly basis. 
(ATA 2011). 
 
In addition, the BTS DB1B “Market” database includes revenue generated from cargo flown on passenger 
flights, and revenue from airline bag, cancelation, change, pets, and frequent flyer charges are not 
included in the DB1B airfare and must be added. Examination of airline revenue reports reported in the 
Aviation Daily, show substantial revenue gained by the airlines from cargo flown on passenger flights, 
airline baggage fees, cancelation fees, change fees, transportation of pets, and frequent flyer charges. 
The revenue realized by airlines from freight and mail on passenger flights is estimated at 2.4% of airfare, 
from Aviation Daily Airline Revenue reports.  By aggregating the revenue from fees and dividing by 
passenger enplanements, this revenue was found to be $10.17 per passenger enplanement ( Table 2). 
 
 
 Table 2: Airline revenue from Aviation Daily Airline Revenue reports 
To reflect true revenue from passengers from the DB1B airfares, the airfare must be reduced by 5.1% 
(7.5% - 2.4%) and increased by $0.44 ($10.17 - $3.60 - $3.63 -$2.50). 
 
Adjusted Airfare $ = [ Airfare – (Airfare * 0.051) ] + $0.44 
 
2.5 Willingness-to-Pay Curves (Cumulative Demand vs. Adjusted Airfare) 
There are three traditional models used to describe the relationship between passenger demand and 
airfare: gravity models, exponential models, and S-curve or logit models. For a description of the 
differences between these models see Ferguson (2011). 
The AFRS-OM model uses the exponential model.  
Cumulative Passenger Demand = Market Size Coefficient * e (Airfare Sensitivity Coefficient * Airfare) 
 
The market Size coefficient and the Airfare Sensitivity Coefficient are computed based on the data 
available from the Bureau of Transportation Statistics (BTS) The methods for extracting the  Average 
Airfares and Demand are described in the sections below. The data used for the analysis is derived from 
the Airline Origin and Destination Survey (DB1B) database (U.S. DOT/BTS 2010). The DB1B database 
is a 10% sample of airline tickets from reporting carriers collected by the Office of Airline Information of 
the Bureau of Transportation Statistics. Data includes origin, destination and other itinerary details of 
passengers transported.  
 
The DB1B market database contains directional market characteristics of each domestic itinerary of the 
Origin and Destination Survey, such as the reporting carrier, origin and destination airport, prorated 
market fare, number of market coupons, market miles flown, and carrier change indicators.  Round trip 
itineraries are split in two for this database.  This database contains direct itineraries and connecting 
2008** 2009 
Ancillary Fees* 7.50 $        10.17 $      
Bags 2.09 $        3.54 $        
Cancel 2.20 $        3.08 $        
* Bags, Cancel/Change, Pets, Freq Flyer 
** Based on 3rd & 4th Quarter 
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itineraries, as shown in the number of segments in the itineraries in Table 3.  In order to evaluate 
passenger demand for non-stop direct domestic markets or segments the airfares for these connecting 
itineraries (more than one segment) must be further prorated down to the segments of interest. 
 
 
Table 3: Airline Origin and Destination Survey (DB1B) “Market” database 
2.5.1 Estimating Average Airfares 
Two traditional approaches to prorating segment fares from an itinerary fare have been used (see 
Ferguson, 2011). The first method is known as the”yield approach,” because the segment’s airfare is 
generated from an average yield or revenue per passenger mile. For example, an itinerary with revenue 
$400 for 400 miles has a yield of $1 per passenger mile. A proration of this revenue for a 200 mile 
segment would be $1 per passenger mile times 200 miles, or $200 per passenger. This approach is used to 
split the fare for round trip itineraries into the DB1B market itineraries. Although this approach is simple, 
it loses accuracy for itineraries in which the stage length of the segments vary significantly.  
 
A second method prorates the airfares based upon actual direct single segment fares. In this approach, the 
single direct non-stop segment fares for all of the segments of the itinerary are extracted and then used to 
determine the proportion of the whole itinerary airfare for each segment. The proportion for each segment 
is equal to the fraction of  each segment’s direct non-stop segment airfare over the sum of all the single 
direct non-stop segment fares for all of the segments of the itinerary. For example, an itinerary with 
revenue $400 for 400 miles has two segments of 100 and 300 miles respectively. The direct non-stop 
segment airfares for these segments were $150 and $350 respectively. Then this method would apply 30% 
($150/($150+$350)) of the $400 for the itinerary airfare or $120 for the 100 mile segment and the 
remaining $280 for the 300 mile segment. While this approach is considered the best approach for 
prorating, it is also very complex and not all segments flown have non-stop segment airfares, so 
approximation methods have been developed to represent this method. 
 
American Airlines applies an approximation method which prorates airfare based on the square root of 
the segment distance divided by the sum of the segment distance square roots (Le 2006). GRA, Inc. uses 
an approximation method which prorates airfare based on the 0.74 power of the segment distance divided 
by the sum of the .74 power of all itinerary segment distances.  Analysis of DB1B data showed that 
segment distance to the 0.4166 power divided by the sum of the 0.4166 power of all itinerary segment 
distances was the best fit to approximate method two above.  
 
However, prorating based on the square root of the segment distance performs nearly as well, as shown in 
Figure 3, which shows an analysis of 2522 itineraries for PHL airport third quarter 2007. Each of these 
itineraries had three flight segments which could individually be analyzed in the BTS DB1B database for 
average fares. A comparative analysis is shown between the different approximating techniques used to 
prorate segment fare versus individual proration by segment fare. 
Year Qtr 
number of  
segments 
# of  
Itineraries 
% of  
Itineraries 
# of Pax % of Pax 
2007 3 1 2,041,131     39% 7,973,245   67% 
2007 3 2 2,916,989     55% 3,580,773   30% 
2007 3 3 266,179          5% 274,450        2% 
2007 3 4 or more 31,684          1% 32,235         0.3% 
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Figure 3: Comparison of different proration approximation techniques versus individual 
proration by segment fares 
In this example none of the approximation techniques exhibited satisfactyory fits to the proration by 
segment fares technique, however segment fares are not available for all itinerary segments and the 
approximation techniques eliminate variances between these segment fare percentages.  To avoid adding 
another source of variance in the source data for the ASOM, proration based on the square root of the 
segment distance is used in this study.  Even though the .4166 proration approximation method performs 
slightly better than the square root method, the square root method is a recognized method in the air 
transportation industry. 
 
2.5.2 Estimating Cumulative Demand 
To generate the cumulative demand the individual passenger itineraries from the DB1B data were 
aggregated. For example, if there are 2 passengers who bought $500 segment airfares, 19 passengers who 
bought $300 segment airfares, 29 passengers who bought $200 segment airfares, and 50 passengers who 
bought $150 segment airfares, then there are 100 passengers who bought segment airfares at an average 
fare of $200.  But, not all passengers bought tickets at $200.  Thus, one must consider the curve to 
determine the loss/gain in passenger demand as prices are increased/decreased.  The above simple 
example suggests that if the airlines were to increase the average airfares for this segment to $250, then 
the demand would be reduced to 50 passengers as shown in Table 4; i.e. the cumulative demand of all 
passengers willing to pay at least $250 is 50 passengers. 
 
Since the itineraries in the DB1B data represent an itinerary for a quarter (90 days), it is not possible to 
analyze differences across days of the week, times of the day, and various holidays.  Additionally, the 
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DB1B database reveals no information about the type of ticket purchased (e.g. refundable, coach, frequent 
flyer upgrade, weekend stay) or how much in advance these tickets were purchased (e.g. six weeks or 3 
weeks ahead or day of purchase).  Therefore, all of these average behaviors are assumed to be 
homogeneous in the data. 
 
 
Table 4: Transformation of DB1B data to Passenger Demand Behavior Data 
Data representing passenger behavior of demand versus airfares can be found in the Bureau of 
Transportation Statistics (BTS) Airline Origin and Destination Survey (DB1B) database. (U.S. DOT/BTS 
2010). This database is used to determine air traffic patterns, air carrier market shares and passenger 
flows.  For the ASOM this database will be used to derive passenger demand versus revenue curves.  The 
first step of this process is to estimate passenger demand versus airfare curves for each market; this 
process is discussed in detail in chapter 4. 
 
2.5.3 Estimating Cumulative Demand vs Average Airfare Curves 
Once the passenger demand versus airfare curves are derived for the quarterly demand from the DB1B 
data these curves are extrapolated to the BTS T100 daily demand levels.  This is done by multiplying by 
the ratio of T100 daily demand over the DB1B quarterly demand. These curves are then fit into an 
exponential representation of passenger demand versus airfare, to derive intercept and slope coefficients 
from the log-linear regression fit of the data. 
Cumulative Passenger Demand = Market Size Coefficient * e (Airfare Sensitivity Coefficient * Airfare) 
 
These derived coefficients are then adjusted to reflect changes in fuel price and its effect on passenger 
price elasticity and passenger demand.  Demand coefficients are decayed 0.52% (adj R2 = 54.0%) for 
each $1 increase in hedged fuel prices.  Price coefficients are decayed 12.59% (adj R2 = 36.7%) for each 
$1 increase in hedged fuel prices. These decay rates are applied to the individual market demand versus 
revenue curves to capture the effects of fuel prices changes. 
 
To develop piece-wise revenue versus demand segments, a portion of the revenue curve is plotted from 
zero demand to four times the historic demand. Departure and Arrival curves are generated for three 
periods during the day (6:00am to 12:00pm, 12:01pm to 5:00pm, and 5:01pm to 12:00am) and all 15 
minute time windows during the day that flights were reported in the ASPM database. 
 
The maximum demand is normalized for the period or 15 minute time window by multiplying the 
percentage of aircraft seats flown during the period compared to all seats flown.  Fifteen piecewise 
segments are created for the periods and ten for the 15 minute time windows.  The demand is calculated 
in equal intervals up to the maximum demand as shown in the formula below: 
 
Period Demand Intervals = (4 x Daily T100 market demand x (period seats)/(total seats))/15 
 
15 min Demand Intervals = (4 x Daily T100 market demand x (period seats)/(total seats))/10 
Segment 
Airfare
# of Pax
Segment 
Revenue
Cumulative 
Revenue
Average 
Airfare
Cumulative 
Pax
500$              2                     1,000$           1,000$          500$               2                      
300$              19                   5,700$           6,700$          319$               21                    
200$              29                   5,800$           12,500$        250$               50                    
150$              50                   7,500$           20,000$        200$               100                  
DB1B Data Passenger Behavior Data
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For each of these data points the demand is plugged back into the fitted exponential demand versus airfare 
formula, with adjusted coefficients based upon changes in fuel prices as shown below. 
 
Piecewise Demand Airfare = (Ln(Piecewise Demand)-Ln(Demand Coefficient))/(Price Coefficient) 
 
The Revenue is then calculated as the Piecewise Demand Airfare multiplied by the Piecewise Demand.   
 
Figure 4 shows an example of derived period revenue versus demand curves for the BOS-ATL market. 
Periods 4-6 represent periods for arrivals at the market, ATL in this case.  Similar curves are generated for 
all 15 minute time windows with historic flights. 
 
 
Figure 4: BOS-ATL Period Revenue versus Demand Curves 3QTR 2007 
2.6 Model for Adjusting Willingness-to-Pay Curves for Economic Changes 
Airfare Sensitivity Coefficients exhibit significant fluctuations as the state of the economy changes (see 
Figure 5). To account for these changes a unique model was developed by Ferguson (2010) to adjust the 
market Size Coefficient and the Airfare Sensitivity Coefficient for the exponential willingness-to-pay 
curves (Figure 6).  
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Figure 5: Variation in price elasticity for Q3 from 2005 to 2009.  
  
Figure 6: Alternate strategies for adjusting revenue to reflect economic changes 
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Ferguson (2011) analyzed the effects from fluctuations in fuel prices and national unemployment rates on 
passenger behavior. The analysis included 600 markets with at least 8 different price points, for 23 
quarters, 1st quarter 2005 to 3rd quarter 2010, and from 10 airports (EWR, JFK, LGA, SFO, DFW, BOS, 
PHL, BWI, IAD, DCA). The markets analyzed in the study are summarized in Table 5.  
 
 
Table 5: Number of Markets examined for effects from Economic fluctuations by size and 
Airport 
Departures from the airports examined in this analysis represented 17.26% of the US domestic departures 
in 2007, see Table 6. 
 
 
Table 6: Percentage of 2007 US Domestic Flights from Airports in this analysis 
The analysis was conducted using a tiered regression approach; first 27,600 regressions were performed 
in Matlab to quantify the coefficients for the 600 markets for 23 quarters and for two different fitting 
strategies   (600 x23x2=27,600).  The market demand coefficient and the price coefficient from the 
exponential fit of the exponential, is shown in the equation below. 
 
                                                             
 
Next a longitudinal multiple-regression is performed in Mini-tab to determine the functional contribution 
to the variance between these coefficients from changes in fuel prices and national unemployment.  
Airport small market large market Total Markets
BOS 33 19 52
BWI 27 21 48
DCA 39 14 53
DFW 90 12 102
EWR 42 19 61
IAD 50 13 63
JFK 28 18 46
LGA 37 16 53
PHL 58 19 77
SFO 26 19 45
Grand Total 430 170 600
Airport Name % of flights 
PHL  Philadelphia International 2.10% 
LGA  LaGuardia 1.84% 
EWR  Newark Liberty International 1.70% 
JFK  Kennedy International 1.47% 
SFO  San Francisco International 1.40% 
BOS  Logan International 1.72% 
IAD  Dulles International 1.38% 
DCA  Ronald Reagan Washington National 1.33% 
BWI  Baltimore/Washington International  1.27% 
DFW  Dallas/Ft Worth International 3.06% 
17.26% Total Percentage of US Domestic Flights 
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Additionally, factors that change over time and between markets are used to develop a better model for 
exponential coefficients over time and between markets.  Specifically this analysis attempts to identify the 
following functional relationships: 
 
                                   
                                             
                                                              
                                                         
                                        
 
                             
                                             
                                                              
                                                         
                                        
 
The following factors are also included in the analysis to capture variances between coefficients for 
different markets over the 23 quarters of examination.  The inverse of the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index 
(Hirschman 1964) or effective number of airlines for each market is included in the model to capture 
differences in the coefficients that can be explained by competition differences. The average daily 
frequency of flights to the market is included in the model to capture differences in the coefficients that 
can be explained by frequency of service. The market distance is included in the model to capture 
differences in the coefficients that can be explained by this factor. The correlation analysis of these 
factors are shown in Table 7. 
 
 
Table 7: Correlation Analysis of Market Factors 
Dummy variables (0 or 1) were included in the regression to capture differences in seasonality, market 
size and differences between airports. Dummy variables for 1st, 2nd and 4th quarter capture the 
differences in the coefficients from these quarters compared to 3rd quarter. A dummy variable for larger 
markets captures the differences in the coefficients from large markets compared to small markets.  
Dummy variables for EWR, JFK, LGA, SFO, DFW, PHL, BWI, IAD, and DCA capture the differences 
in the coefficients from these airports compared to BOS.   
 
In the end, a longitudinal regression is performed in Mini-tab to determine the functional contribution to 
the variance between these coefficients from changes in fuel prices and national unemployment.  These 
coefficients of change for the market demand and price coefficients are then regressed against market 
Market 
Distance
Effective 
# of 
Airlines
pearson 
correlation 
coeff
-0.026
P-value 0.002
pearson 
correlation 
coeff
-0.054 0.004
P-value 0 0.632
Daily 
Frequency 
of Service
Effective # 
of Airlines
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distance to determine the impact market distance has on the impact of fuel prices and national 
unemployment on the exponential demand function. 
 
The results of these 24 longitudinal multiple-regressions are shown in Table 8. The analysis shows the 
difference between airports in their exponential passenger demand versus average airfare curves to 
fluctuations in economic conditions.  The green highlighted cells show positive coefficients for changes 
in fuel prices or national unemployment rates. The yellow cells highlight coefficients chosen for use in 
the ASOM to reflect the fluctuations in economic conditions. The empty cells represent cases where no 
significant statistical relationships exist between demand and price coefficients to changes in fuel prices 
or national unemployment rates. 
 
Markets Effect on Exponential Demand Coefficient Effect on Exponential Price Coefficient 
$1 Increase in Fuel 
Price 
1% Increase in 
Unemployment 
$1 Incraese in Fuel 
Price 
1% Increase in 
Unemployment 
All  -0.52% -0.33% -12.59% -1.8% 
Major -0.67% -0.43% -15.34% -3.16% 
DFW   -13.52% -1.29% 
BOS   -6.81% 1.56% 
LGA   -4% 1.57% 
JFK 1.8%  -9.49% -1.17% 
EWR -3.5% -0.97% -5.9% -3.2% 
SFO -1.35% -0.85% -18.86% -3.1% 
PHL 0.76%    
BWI   -10.47% -3.33% 
IAD -2.19% -0.86% -25.5% -5.09% 
DCA -0.88% -0.39% -21.27% -3.475 
Table 8: Impact of Fluctuations in Economy on Exponential Demand and Price Coefficients 
The analysis of individual airports showed that for several airports the demand coefficient was not 
sensitive to changes in economic activity. On the other hand JFK and PHL showed positive increases in 
demand due to significant changes in airline service at these airports (i.e. Delta at JFK and 
SWA/USAirways at PHL). These anomalies may reflect increased demand due to airport business 
expansion and since this information is not reflected in any data provided, it is incorrectly reporting the 
source of demand increases to the economic changes. 
 
The analysis showed that only PHL’s price coefficient was insensitive to changes in the economy. In most 
cases other than BOS and LGA, when the economy worsened either through increased fuel prices or 
increased unemployment rates passengers became less price sensitive. In other words, as the economy 
worsened, although total demand decreased, passenger who did fly were less sensitive to price changes. 
Further longitudinal analysis of the sensitivity of the demand and price coefficients to market distance did 
not reveal any statistically significant results. 
 
Table 9 shows the final results from this analysis of economic fluctuations on exponential fits of 
passenger versus average airfare curves. As previously discussed an increase in fuel prices will reduce 
passenger demand by 0.52% and reduce passenger price sensitivity by 12.59%. Similarly a 1% increase in 
the unemployment rate will reduce passenger demand by 0.33% and reduce passenger price sensitivity by 
1.80%. The analysis also showed that when an additional flight leaves a market, passenger price 
sensitivity is reduced 2.71% and passenger demand is reduced 0.94%. Similarly adding additional flights 
per day for a market reduces the price sensitivity of the passenger by 1.27%.   
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 Left 5% and Right 10% Trimming 
Effects from: % Change in demand coefficient % Change in price coefficient 
15% increase in fuel price -0.52% -12.59% 
1% increase in unemployment -0.33% -1.8% 
Additional flight leaves a market  -2.71% 
Additional daily flight 0.94% -1.27% 
Additional mile of market distance 0.0057% -0.0459% 
Table 9: Effects on Exponential Demand and Price Coefficients from economic or market 
changes 
2.7 Model for Aircraft Operating Cost 
Aircraft direct operating costs, flights hours, and gallons of fuel issued for flight operations reported by 
the airlines for different aircraft types are found in the BTS P52 database. (U.S. DOT/BTS 2010) This 
data is combined with the average aircraft sizes as reported in the BTS T100 database, to evaluate aircraft 
costs by seat classes of aircraft as shown in Table 10. 
 
Aircraft Type Gallons 
Fuel 
Purchased 
Block 
Hours 
Flown 
Total Flying 
Operations 
(Thousands) 
Aircraft Fuel 
(Thousands) 
Total Costs Seat 
Class (25 
incre-
ments) 
Average 
Number 
of Seats 
Dassault-Breguet 
Mystere-Falcon 2403.89 6.26 14256.47 9186.2 27474.84 25 15 
Embraer Emb-120 
Brasilia 176006.8 1015.66 930287 359298 1373276 25 30 
British Aerospace 
Jetstream 41 33486.27 185.33 171115.2 47609.18 243776.72 25 30 
Dornier 328 1956.98 9.81 11525.63 2087.81 19902.7 25 32 
Dornier 328 Jet 65247.15 147.93 151197.4 61217.16 209081.4 25 32 
Saab-Fairchild 340/B 170075.9 854.23 766019.62 224019.35 1161626.33 25 34 
Dehavilland Dhc8-
100 Dash-8 45871.36 224.08 229235.62 117181.03 358769.34 25 37 
Dehavilland Dhc8-
200q Dash-8 78240.45 329.16 384947 126905 607658 25 37 
Embraer-135 477869.9 958.14 1240000.74 718826.91 1728413.95 50 38 
Embraer-140 539028.2 1127.53 1481180.45 1072785.3 2119802.81 50 44 
Aerospatiale/Aeritali
a Atr-42 9136.27 36.35 55477.16 9283.13 89056.04 50 46 
Canadair Rj-100/Rj-
100er 361640.3 737.85 1335160.16 706771.71 1745900.91 50 50 
Canadair Rj-200er 
/Rj-440 4060526 9247.47 14160262.92 6840975.63 18732150.36 50 50 
Embraer-145 3139725 6909.48 7807875.66 3369430.95 11212819.03 50 50 
Fokker F28-
4000/6000 
Fellowship 2009 2.49 2857 1636 4644 50 60 
Aerospatiale/Aeritali
a Atr-72 170343.5 662.94 1137018.16 338903.66 1759517.69 75 65 
Canadair Rj-700 1683596 3467.29 5477379.84 3163834.42 7604187.55 75 68 
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Aircraft Type Gallons 
Fuel 
Purchased 
Block 
Hours 
Flown 
Total Flying 
Operations 
(Thousands) 
Aircraft Fuel 
(Thousands) 
Total Costs Seat 
Class (25 
incre-
ments) 
Average 
Number 
of Seats 
Embraer 170 228303.4 731.64 570969.61 232515.23 942364.52 75 71 
Dehavilland Dhc8-
400 Dash-8 200529.6 523.84 833386 413604 1293094 75 75 
Embraer Erj-175 64804.75 116.9 98197.93 47384.11 156174.02 75 78 
Canadair Crj 900 597189.6 1004.35 1770298.96 1167686.02 2334563.78 75 83 
Avroliner Rj85 13782.96 24.63 22109.3 13.7 36775.25 75 87 
British Aerospace 
Bae-146-300 78350.63 91.79 215788.03 99377.96 325445.95 75 87 
Mcdonnell Douglas 
Dc-9-10 31214.94 31.85 79877.72 28730.55 121734.84 100 90 
Mcdonnell Douglas 
Dc-9-15f 15112.48 19.59 61434.37 39173.56 83325.7 100 90 
Boeing 727-100 89455.27 73.54 459196 137200 1442355 100 94 
Embraer 190 439637.8 606.18 1601305.17 971057.12 1931610.52 100 100 
Mcdonnell Douglas 
Dc-9-30 1231420 1186.76 3117222.08 1932425.05 4620316.34 100 100 
Fokker 100 180704 218.7 416299 151980 559666 100 100 
Mcdonnell Douglas 
Dc9 Super 87 47186.41 46.35 127370.33 105501.8 155046.53 100 109 
Mcdonnell Douglas 
Dc-9-40 244007.4 218.76 766548.19 475652.48 1050707.55 100 110 
Airbus Industrie A-
318 172903.3 195.73 488438.02 338213.44 605169.03 125 114 
Boeing 717-200 2100535 2516.82 7367710.04 3818645.19 8933208.22 125 114 
Boeing 737-500 2035251 2357.15 6189121 3441500 8179576 125 115 
Boeing 737-200c 125265.4 116.75 309217.41 183634.75 518935.59 125 117 
Mcdonnell Douglas 
Dc-8-40 3468.49 1.9 9672.78 778.42 17397.54 125 124 
Mcdonnell Douglas 
Dc-9-50 600379 495.63 1602135 1144273 2040279 125 125 
Airbus Industrie 
A319 5965815 7344.36 19479203.74 11318197.32 24191601.74 125 127 
Boeing 737-100/200 631073.6 639.57 1537183.53 733806.84 2319208.55 125 127 
Boeing 737-300 7583485 8761.68 21227271.16 11754429.62 30415349.76 125 133 
Boeing 737-
700/700lr 8033821 9908.06 23099102.02 14313398.33 29167134.48 125 136 
Boeing 737-400 1703311 1937.18 5494006.94 3022761.27 7382254.33 150 138 
Mcdonnell Douglas 
Dc9 Super 
80/Md81/2/3/7/8 11978567 10523.74 33566244.76 21399313.23 43709105.61 150 140 
Boeing 727-
200/231a 1213988 807.12 4257408.5 1897688.01 6632034.76 150 141 
Airbus Industrie 
A320-100/200 8783805 10031.71 26972609.73 16743104.12 35359547.69 150 150 
Mcdonnell Douglas 
Md-90 313426.6 318.71 935517 607758 1245212 150 150 
Boeing 737-800 7106670 7700.46 23304509.11 13583302.98 29811762.79 150 153 
Boeing 737-900 811003.2 848.95 2352272 1561211 3063690 175 170 
Boeing 767-
200/Er/Em 2517373 1619.52 6349241.16 4260921.76 9158596.93 175 171 
Mcdonnell Douglas 
Dc-8-61 3473.92 1.88 14555 7071 19725 175 180 
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Aircraft Type Gallons 
Fuel 
Purchased 
Block 
Hours 
Flown 
Total Flying 
Operations 
(Thousands) 
Aircraft Fuel 
(Thousands) 
Total Costs Seat 
Class (25 
incre-
ments) 
Average 
Number 
of Seats 
Mcdonnell Douglas 
Dc-8-72 11744.16 7.65 44137.39 30785.85 62830.29 175 180 
Boeing 757-200 16694830 14007.83 49377616.45 31022288.05 69973647.76 175 183 
Airbus Industrie 
A321 1060516 1073.18 2842535.73 1936926.57 3600290.58 175 185 
Airbus Industrie 
A310-200c/F 767805 429.74 2991040 1315032 5622999.93 225 220 
Mcdonnell Douglas 
Dc-8-62 97033.14 50.54 254571.52 177533.16 360556.77 225 220 
Mcdonnell Douglas 
Dc-8-63f 59297.74 25.66 198211.21 123187.47 249604.58 225 220 
Mcdonnell Douglas 
Dc-8-71 225865.2 122.47 952129.25 455518.18 1468052.59 225 220 
Mcdonnell Douglas 
Dc-8-73 275093.1 144.99 733154.69 269276.61 1320971.81 225 220 
Mcdonnell Douglas 
Dc-8-73f 87113.69 49.43 374761.49 175154.96 492222.39 225 220 
Boeing 757-300 1316069 956.56 3668839.49 2586813.74 4641399.81 225 221 
Boeing 767-
300/300er 11775727 7131.15 34602079.73 22764068.58 44617006.46 250 239 
Airbus Industrie 
A300b/C/F-100/200 35624.12 15.95 52573.9 2612.92 85749.97 250 250 
Airbus Industrie 
A300-B2 286.91 0.14 1989.61 731.77 1989.61 250 250 
Lockheed L-1011-
1/100/200 41634.55 14.9 102808.5 51515.48 131640.29 250 250 
Mcdonnell Douglas 
Dc-10-40 19606.23 6.69 70792.74 52398.1 91378.57 250 250 
Airbus Industrie 
A300-600/R/Cf/Rcf 2938942 1553.58 11174746 5465594 15790284.36 275 267 
Boeing 767-400/Er 2313675 1243.34 5973817 4604816 7762714 275 268 
Mcdonnell Douglas 
Dc-10-10 1796053 720.14 4412822.22 3172960.74 7847969.14 275 270 
Mcdonnell Douglas 
Dc-10-30cf 138266.4 49.8 419810.23 341994.45 480753.42 275 270 
Lockheed L-1011-
500 Tristar 124771.2 47.57 321599.69 197890.73 427804.88 275 283 
Boeing 777-
200/200lr/233lr 10143473 4478.08 26442390 19446111 36478836 300 289 
Airbus Industrie 
A330-200 2018098 1022.81 5668275.9 4254745.83 6844592.38 300 297 
Airbus A330-300 188104 93.84 477224 415195 581625 300 298 
Mcdonnell Douglas 
Dc-10-30 2466383 897.04 5951681.62 3621613.94 9268779.23 300 304 
Mcdonnell Douglas 
Md-11 5858319 2263.7 19207907.5 10144587.84 26259951.67 325 323 
Boeing 747-400 7696316 2247.73 18252934.26 12401840.53 22459693.11 375 363 
Boeing 747c 28365.98 9.68 121403 65763.38 121674.68 400 400 
Boeing 747f 1251978 334.63 2841899.82 1993671.56 3555480.71 400 400 
Boeing 747-200/300 3772962 1006.65 7151432.56 4482485.25 10198427.08 425 430 
Boeing 747-100 791881.6 201.64 1586895.8 1201277.28 2166858.08 450 452 
Table 10: BTS P52 reported costs, flight hours and gallons issued 3QTR 2002 – 4QTR2010 
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This data is aggregated by seat class to provide aircraft direct operating costs by hour and average fuel 
burn rates by aircraft class for a current aircraft scenario, for a modern aircraft smoothed scenario, and for 
a best in class (BIC) scenario as shown in Table 11.  Note current reporting aircraft are absent for the 200 
and 350 seat classes. 
 
 
Table 11: ASOM Cost factors and fuel burn rates aggregated by aircraft sizes for current, 
modern, and best in class scenarios 
The hourly air fuel consumption is calculated by dividing total air fuel numbers issued for the aggregate 
aircraft class by the total hours flown by the same seat class. 
 
The hourly aircraft direct expenses not related to fuel consumption are calculated by subtracting total fuel 
costs from total direct operational costs for the aggregate aircraft class, then dividing this by the total 
hours flown by the same seat class.  These operational costs varied based upon the aircraft type.   
 
The current aircraft reported in the BTS P52 database, shown in Figure 7, do not reveal smooth curves 
when plotting direct operating costs minus fuel and fuel burn rates per seat. This was an important 
observation of the input data for the AFRS-OM model since the model will be maximizing profit by 
subtracting direct costs from revenue.  Early runs of the AFRS-OM model showed the model did not like 
to choose the 50 or 100 seat classes in the schedules, where historically these sized aircraft are flown. 
Since the burn rates for these classes are much higher than their neighboring seat classes these flight 
options were typically avoided. These cost factors and burn rates are used in the current aircraft scenarios. 
 
To develop a modern aviation cost and performance scenario, all aircraft fuel burn rates higher than 10 
gallons per seat-hour were removed and regressions were performed to derive new cost factors and burn 
rates for a modern fleet of aircraft.  Putting all the aircraft on the same regression line of costs per seat-
hour and gallons per seat-hour, removes any biases of the AFRS-OM choosing an aircraft type over 
another because of lags which exist in the air transportation fleet modernization programs. These new 
Size Gallons/ Hr Avg $/ hr - fuel Gallons/ Hr Avg $/ hr - fuel Gallons/ Hr Avg $/ hr - fuel
25 206  $                    616 164  $                    320 139  $                    340 
50 452  $                    703 334  $                    618 283  $                    634 
75 459  $                    704 511  $                    893 433  $                    882 
100 942  $                1,058 695  $                1,145 589  $                1,084 
125 843  $                1,059 885  $                1,374 750  $                1,239 
150 979  $                1,144 1082  $                1,580 918  $                1,348 
175 1201  $                1,262 1286  $                1,763 1091  $                1,411 
200 1497  $                1,923 1270  $                1,428 
225 1589  $                2,287 1715  $                2,061 1454  $                1,398 
250 1651  $                1,660 1939  $                2,175 1644  $                1,322 
275 2023  $                2,357 2170  $                2,267 1840  $                1,200 
300 2282  $                1,664 2408  $                2,336 2042  $                1,200 
325 2588  $                4,004 2652  $                2,382 2250  $                1,200 
350 2907  $                2,393 2466  $                1,200 
375 3424  $                2,603 3162  $                2,405 2682  $                1,200 
400 3741  $                2,535 3426  $                2,382 2907  $                1,200 
425 3748  $                2,651 3698  $                2,337 3138  $                1,200 
450 3927  $                1,912 3976  $                2,268 3374  $                1,200 
Modern Smoothed BIC SmoothedCurrent as Reported in BTS
no historic data reported
no historic data reported
 22 
 
formulas also allow cost factors and burn rates to be assigned to the 200 and 250 seat classes. The 
formulas are as follows: 
 
Gallons/ Seat-Hour = (0.0054  Seats) + 6.4057, with an R² of 0.4065 
 
Direct $ / Seat-Hour = (-0.0183 Seats) + 13.276, with an R² of 0.4722 
 
 
 
Figure 7: Current BTS P52 Cost Factors and Fuel Burn Rates per Seat 
 
Note (Figure 8) even when eliminating the older less efficient aircraft from this analysis there are no 
economies of scale observed for aircraft burn rates per seat versus aircraft size. 
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Figure 8: Modern Aircraft scenario Direct Cost Factors and Burn Rates/Seat, with regressions 
 
To develop a best in class aviation cost and performance scenario, the following aircraft in Table 12 were 
regressed for cost factors and burn rates per seat as shown in Figure 9.   
 
 
Table 12: Best in Class Aircraft from BTS P52 database 
 
Gallons/ Seat-Hour = 0.0054x + 6.4057
R² = 0.4065
Direct $ / Seat-Hour = -0.0183x + 13.276
R² = 0.4722
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Name Seats gal/hr-seat $/hr-seat
Dehavilland Dhc8-100 Dash-8 37 5.53            13.52$    
Aerospatiale/Aeritalia Atr-42 46 5.46            17.03$    
Airbus Industrie A319 127 6.40            8.75$      
Airbus Industrie A320-100/200 150 5.84            6.80$      
Airbus Industrie A321 185 5.34            4.56$      
Boeing 757-300 221 6.23            5.12$      
Boeing 767-300/300er 239 6.91            6.95$      
Boeing 767-400/Er 268 6.94            6.95$      
Airbus Industrie A330-200 297 6.64            4.65$      
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Figure 9: Best in Class Aircraft scenario Direct Cost Factors and Burn Rates per Seat, with 
regression formulas 
 
Putting all the aircraft on the same regression line of costs per seat-hour and gallons per seat-hour (Figure 
10), removes any biases of the AFRS-OM choosing an aircraft type over another because of lags which 
exist in the air transportation fleet modernization programs. These new formulas also allow cost factors 
and burn rates to be assigned to the 200 and 250 seat classes. The formulas are as follows: 
 
Gallons/ Seat-Hour = (0.0051 Seats) + 5.2578, with an R² of 0.5661 
 
Direct $ / Seat-Hour = (- 0.039 Seats) + 15.066, with an R² of 0.7095 
 
Note that even limiting the analysis to the Best-in-Class by aircraft size, there exist only marginal 
economies-of-scale observed for aircraft burn rates per seat versus aircraft size. 
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Figure 10: Fuel Burn Rates per Seat (on primary y-axis) and Total Cost Rate (on secondary y-
axis) by Aircraft Size. Data Source: BTS P-52 Data. 
The flight costs for markets are derived by multiplying the average scheduled flights times from the FAA 
ASPM database by the aircraft respective cost factors, burn rates and fuel costs as shown below. 
 
Market flight costs = (Direct $/ hr + (Gallons/ hr x Fuel Price) x avg scheduled block times + landing fees 
 
The landing fees applied in the ASOM are shown below in Table 13. 
 
Aircraft that have historically been used for domestic flights are grouped into fleet classes at increments 
of 25 seats.  For example, aircraft between 88 seats and 112 seats would be in the 100 seat fleet class as 
shown in Table 14. As this table shows 92.14% of the passengers flown and 81.53% of the departures 
were performed on seven fleet classes for aircraft between 13 and 187 seats. Since the AFRS-OM selects 
only aircraft for each market’s schedule based on aircraft historically flown to each market, the model 
will be for the most part choosing between these seven fleet classes to determine the most profitable 
aircraft class to meet the demand. 
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Table 13: ASOM Landing Fees 
 
 
Table 14: Summary, seat-capacity groups of aircraft historically used for domestic operations 
 
Flight demand is not captured at the 15 min level of fidelity, as market demand by time of day is assumed 
to be proportionally equal to supply (seats) by time of day. The aircraft selected in the schedule is 
assumed to have a load factor of 80% or better. The airline will need to obtain sufficient revenue to have 
Class Avg Weight Avg Seats landing fee $/ seat-landing
25                   39               26  $            112  $                   4.25 
50                   48               50  $            137  $                   2.74 
75                   76               76  $            218  $                   2.86 
100                 116            103  $            330  $                   3.21 
125                 125            124  $            356  $                   2.86 
150                 129            147  $            367  $                   2.49 
175                 241            168  $            686  $                   4.09 
200                 192            204  $            546  $                   2.68 
225                 332            220  $            945  $                   4.30 
250                 317            250  $            904  $                   3.61 
275                 373            270  $         1,062  $                   3.93 
300                 460            305  $         1,312  $                   4.30 
325                 498            327  $         1,421  $                   4.33 
350                 537            350  $         1,530  $                   4.37 
375                 575            372  $         1,640  $                   4.40 
400                 614            394  $         1,749  $                   4.43 
425                 652            416  $         1,859  $                   4.47 
450                 585            452  $         1,668  $                   3.69 
Fleet Class # of Aircraft types seat range % Departures % Passengers
0 42 <13 5.27% 0.24%
25 17 13 - 37 11.59% 2.91%
50 6 38 - 62 24.79% 12.65%
75 11 63 - 87 8.59% 6.55%
100 4 88 - 112 1.65% 1.72%
125 9 113 - 137 24.59% 32.81%
150 6 138 - 162 16.14% 26.24%
175 4 163 - 187 5.78% 12.18%
200 188 - 212 0.00% 0.00%
225 1 213 - 237 0.39% 1.06%
250 1 238 - 262 0.74% 2.14%
275 10 263 - 287 0.43% 1.37%
300 2 288 - 312 0.01% 0.04%
325 313 - 337 0.00% 0.00%
350 1 338 - 362 0.00% 0.00%
375 1 363 - 387 0.03% 0.09%
400 1 388 - 412 0.00% 0.00%
425 413 - 437 0.00% 0.00%
450 1 438 - 462 0.00% 0.00%
 27 
 
the flight profitable at an 80% load factor, or the optimization will choose a smaller aircraft size or move 
the flight to an alternative time period. The model allows demand to spill into different time slots, but 
restricts demand from moving between morning, afternoon, or evening time periods. This is done by 
nesting demand into 3 periods (12am-12pm, 12pm-5pm and 5pm-12am) to ensure the sum of the 15 
minutes demand does not exceed the demand from the period.   
 
2.8 AFRS-OM Outputs 
There are two text files created by the model for each run.  A sample log file, shown in Figure 11, 
illustrates the number of markets or sub problems initiated for the model.  This file also identifies the 
number of these initial markets that are profitable.  This file shows the number of iterations back and forth 
between Main and Sub-problems.  Lastly, the expected profit from the final airport’s schedule is shown. 
  
Figure 11: AFRS-OM Log File 
 
The second output file is the schedule file, Figure 12.  This file shows all of the individual flights on the 
airport’s final schedule.  For each flight or row of data the market served, the size of aircraft, the 
departure time, the arrival time and the frequency is shown. 
 
The aircraft sizes are grouped into classes in 25 seat intervals; to determine the class, the size is multiplied 
by 25 seats, for example the first row identifies a size 6 as 6*25 = 150 seat aircraft.   
 
The departure and arrival times are shown in 15 min intervals starting with 1 or 12:15am.  The arrival or 
departure time which is less than 96 (there are 96 15-minute intervals in a 24-hour day) determines 
whether this is an arrival or departure from the airport modeled.  To determine the arrival or departure 
time at the other airport subtract 96 from its number.  For example the first row shows a departure from 
the modeled airport to ABE at 76 (1900 hrs or 7:00pm) and this flight arrives at ABE at 178-96 = 82 
(2030hrs or 8:30pm ABE local time).  All times reported in the schedule are local times. 
 
This schedule data from ASOM can be copied into a spreadsheet program to generate charts and tables 
and compare different scenarios based on different input parameters. 
init_problems():91 markets. (initial markets)
add ABE_0_1 ,z = 14580.140000000003 cost = 13142.0, frequency = 2.0(2), throughput= 300.0, gap=0.0, reduced cost 
=14580.139000000003
……….
add TYS_0_64 ,z = 1186.4142857142815 cost = 14124.0, frequency = 2.0(2), throughput= 150.0, gap=0.0, reduced cost 
=1186.4132857142815
Generate columns – 64 Profitable Markets
add ABE_1_65 ,z = 14580.139999999994 cost = 13142.0, frequency = 2.0(2), throughput= 300.0, gap=0.0, reduced cost 
=14530.138999999994
……….
add TYS_1_128 ,z = 1186.4142857142838 cost = 14124.0, frequency = 2.0(2), throughput= 150.0, gap=0.0, reduced cost 
=1136.4132857142838
generate_columns() ended with 128columns in master_vars
generate_columns() ended with 64 columns generated at the current node.
Generate columns
add ABE_2_129 ,z = 14580.139999999996 cost = 13142.0, frequency = 2.0(2), throughput= 300.0, gap=0.0, reduced cost 
=2910.1389999999956
……..
add STL_6_311 ,z = 8221.784615384611 cost = 99270.0, frequency = 10.0(10), throughput= 750.0, gap=0.0, reduced cost 
=428.78361538461104
add TPA_6_312 ,z = 312182.0929837098 cost = -5.3657078780133816E-12, frequency = 10.0(10), throughput= 2750.0, gap=0.0, reduced 
cost =312132.09198370983
generate_columns() ended with 312columns in master_vars
Total profit: 6743454.0
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Figure 12: AFRS-OM schedule file 
 
 
3 AFRS-OM VALIDATION AND LIMITATIONS 
The following outputs of the ASOM were analyzed: (1) the number of profitable markets served, (2) the 
daily domestic flights by market, (3) the average revenue per seat, (4) the average aircraft size in seats per 
operation, and (5) the overall profitability of each airport studied. The controls or exogenous factors for 
the model are fuel prices and airport capacity limits. 
 
The analysis of statistically significant trends between the exogenous factors and the ASOM outputs 
required the following multi-step process: 
 
3.1 Validation 
Validation of the model is conducted using historic data. The model inputs are set to the actual data from 
the quarter of the year evaluated. The model outputs are checked against the actual data. 
The validation is performed for consistency in trends and in relationships (as the AFRS-OM does not 
account for flight schedules, or aircraft assigned, for reasons other than profit, e.g. marketshare, strategic 
positioning, …), and balances arrivals and departures, therefore no banking is allowed.  
 
A summary is shown of a consistency check for markets served, scheduled flights per day and aircraft 
gauge when compared to the historic behavior of the airlines serving these five airports (LGA, EWR, 
JFK, SFO, PHL) for three different economic scenarios: 3QTR07 with $2 fuel prices. The AFRS-OM 
Market Size Dep Time Arr Time Freq
ABE 6 76 178 1.0
ABE 6 176 86 1.0
ACK 2 39 143 1.0
ACK 2 123 35 1.0
……
TYS 3 73 180 1.0
TYS 3 152 67 1.0
Market Fleet size i j freq local time seats year qtr airport cap fp dist ASM
ABE 6 76 178 1 76 150 2009 3 EWR 9 8 67 10050
ABE 6 176 86 1 86 150 2009 3 EWR 9 8 67 10050
ACK 2 39 143 1 39 50 2009 3 EWR 9 8 218 10900
ACK 2 123 35 1 35 50 2009 3 EWR 9 8 218 10900
ALB 3 26 130 1 26 75 2009 3 EWR 9 8 143 10725
Comment profit & fleet #2
airport EWR
year 2009
cap 12
fp 8
Values
Row Labels Sum of ASM Sum of seats Sum of freq Average Size
ATL 6518750 8750 42
Grand Total 99574150 94350 628 150.24           
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scheduled on average 2% fewer markets and 12% fewer flights for aircraft 5% smaller. The results are 
summarized in Table 15. 
 
Statistic Markets Flights per Day Aircraft Size 
Mean -2% -12% -5% 
Standard Deviation 2% 5% 19% 
Range 6% 19% 64% 
Minimum -6% -21% -28% 
Maximum -21% -2% 36% 
Count 15 15 15 
Table 15: ASOM results for consistency check - geographic access 
3.2 Limitations 
The AFRS-OM models exhibits the following limitations: 
1. The model considers airline decisions on markets, schedule and fleet exclusively based on operational 
profitability. The decision-making does not account for strategic positioning of aircraft or competitive 
market share considerations. 
 
2. The model chooses only profitable markets to serve and does not consider staying in unprofitable 
markets during down economic times in order to retain market share.  As a consequence, the model is 
likely to move out of markets more rapidly than might actually occur during recessionary periods. 
 
3. The model accounts for only a single airline serving these profitable markets, which finds the optimal 
schedule minus airline competition. For the analysis of EWR and SFO (hubs for large carriers), this 
assumption may be closer to actual behavior than at airports such as LGA where there is significant 
competition at the airport. For example, this single airline model will choose to use a larger aircraft in 
shuttle markets rather than have (as is currently the case) eight departures from LGA to DCA in a single 
hour. 
 
4. The model balances arrivals and departures and does not model the advantages of banking (i.e. having 
many incoming flights during one period that would allow passengers to connect to other flights during 
the next few periods). 
 
5. The model also tries to satisfy the demand based on historic data. Thus, it does not allow demand 
from the morning to spill into the afternoon. 
 
4 CASE STUDY: EFFECT OF CAPACITY LIMITS AND FUEL 
PRICES 
Ferguson (2011a) describes a case study of the effects of capacity and fuel price on airline decision-
making. Specifically, this case-study describes a comparison of the behavior of the air transportation 
system (e.g. markets served, airfares, delays, load factors, aircraft size) during a run-up in fuel prices at 
capacity-limited New York airports (EWR, LGA, JFK) and non-slot controlled San Francisco (SFO) and 
Philadelphia (PHL) airports.  
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4.1 Design of Experiment 
The design of the experiment includes 96 treatments: 8 airports (BOS, DFW, EWR, JFK, LGA, ORD, 
PHL, SFO), by 3 flight capacity levels (VFR, MVFR< IFR), by 4 hedged fuel prices ($2, $3, $4, $5). The 
passenger demand versus airfare curves are used for the summer of 2007. 
 
Note: These experiments include analysis of hedged fuel prices of $5/gallon. Historically, fuel prices have 
not exceeded $3.70/gallon (07/2008). As a consequence the effect on wholesale prices paid by the airline 
and passenger demand is largely unknown. 
 
4.2 Effects of increase of Increase in Fuel Prices on Airline Behavior 
The airline response to changes in fuel prices is driven by the interaction between increased costs of 
operation and the effect of increased airfares on demand. Fuel prices drive an increase in operating costs. 
The change in operating costs, shifts the maximum profit point to smaller aircraft accomodating fewer 
higher airfare passengers.  
 
Overall, the airline transportation system is sensistive to changes in fuel price. Geographic access (i.e. 
markets served, -1.1%) and frequency of service (-0.3%) are maintained. However, due to increases in 
airfares ($34 for every $1/gallon increase in hedged fuel price), fewer passengers (-8.7% per $1/gallon 
increase) are transported in smaller aircraft (-7.5% per $1/gallon increase). This has no effect on 
congestion (-1.4% reduction in flights per day per $1/gallon increase), but a significant reduction in fuel 
burn (-8.3% per $1/gallon increase). 
 
The increase in fuel prices results in a shift in the economic “operating point.” To maximize profit (Table 
16), airlines adjust the airfares (Table 17) to capture fewer higher paying passengers (Table 18) that will 
fly on smaller aircraft (Table 19). These changes impact the average flights per market (Table 20) which 
is determined by the flights per day (Table 21), markets served (Table 22), and fuel burn (Table 23).  
 
The “physics” of the travel demand and operating costs, allow the airlines to maintain the same levels of 
profit as fuel prices increase. On average the loss in profitability in the face of increasing costs is -3.2% 
across all eight airports. JFK (-6.7%) and SFO (-5.8%) experience the largest loss in profits. BOS (-
0.6%), LGA(-1.4%), and EWR (-1.9%) experience the least drop in profit. The total daily loss of profit 
across all eight airports is $5M. 
 
DAILY AIRLINE PROFITS ($M)               
  BOS DFW EWR JFK LGA ORD PHL SFO 8 AIRPORTS 
$2  5.4 9.5 5.2 4.5 4.9 11.7 4.7 5.7 51.6 
$3  5.2 8.9 5 4 4.7 11.3 4.3 5.1 48.5 
$4  5.2 8.6 4.8 3.7 4.6 10.6 4.2 4.8 46.5 
$5  5.3 8.6 4.9 3.6 4.7 10.6 4.2 4.7 46.6 
Change in daily 
profit for +$1/gal 
increase -0.03 -0.30 -0.10 -0.30 -0.07 -0.37 -0.17 -0.33 -1.67 
% Change in daily 
profits for a +$1/gal 
increase 0.6 3.2 1.9 6.7 1.4 3.1 3.5 5.8 3.2 
Table 16: Change in airline profit for 8 airports for fuel price increasing from $2 to $5/gallon 
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The change in fuel price, results in changes in operating costs, and drives the economics of airline 
operations to fly fewer higher paying passengers (Table 17). Average airfares increased on average 18.3% 
for each $1/gallon change in fuel. This was equivalent to a $26.13 increase in average airfares for each 
$1/gallon change in fuel. 
 
AVERAGE AIRFARE 
        
 
BOS DFW EWR JFK LGA ORD PHL SFO 8 AIRPORTS 
$2  136 131 160 152 132 135 117 180 142.88 
$3  152 158 191 175 155 151 138 209 166.13 
$4  174 178 221 205 178 186 161 243 193.25 
$5  200 204 254 231 200 214 185 282 221.25 
Change in average 
airfare for  +$1/gal 
increase 21.33 24.33 31.33 26.33 22.67 26.33 22.67 34.00 26.13 
% Change in 
average airfare for a 
+$1/gal increase 15.7 18.6 19.6 17.3 17.2 19.5 19.4 18.9 18.3 
Table 17: Change in airfare served for 8 airports for fuel price increasing from $2 to $5/gallon 
The change in airfare was homogeneous across all 8 airports. SFO experienced the largest change in 
average airfare $34 for each $1 increase in fuel, followed by EWR ($31.33). BOS airfares changed the 
least, $21.33. The average change in airfare across all 8 airports was $26.15 with a median of $25.33. 
 
The change in airfare affected the number of passengers that were willing to pay the price of travel (Table 
18). The change in passengers traveling was homogeneous across all 8 airports. On average the higher 
airfares were reflected in an 8.7% drop in passnegers. ORD (-9.7%), SFO (-9.6%) experienced the largest 
reduction in percentage of passengers. LGA (-7.4%) and BOS (-7.5%) experienced the smallest reduction 
in passenger trips. The median percentage reduction in passenger trips, -8.9%, was higher than the mean, 
-8.7%, indicating a slightly fatter right tail. 
 
PAX TRIPS PER DAY 
        
 
BOS DFW EWR JFK LGA ORD PHL SFO 
8 
AIRPORTS 
$2  68,126 140,542 61,730 61,134 64,832 169,880 80,000 63,200 709,444 
$3  63,466 120,560 53,872 54,644 57,494   70,750 55,680 476,466 
$4  57,618 111,328 49,100 48,548 52,894 131,960 62,446 50,120 564,014 
$5  52,738 102,646 45,592 45,672 50,374 120,480 58,198 44,960 520,660 
Change in pax 
trips/day for a 
+$1/gal increase -5,129 -12,632 -5,379 -5,154 -4,819 -16,467 -7,267 -6,080 -62,928 
% Change in 
pax trips/day 
for a +$1/gal 
increase 7.5 9.0 8.7 8.4 7.4 9.7 9.1 9.6 8.9 
Table 18: Change in passengers travelling across all 8 airports for fuel price increasing from 
$2 to $5/gallon 
 32 
 
The fewer, higher paying passengers were accomodated on smaller aircraft. For each $1/gallon increase in 
fuel price, aircraft size decreased by -7.5%, which is equivalent to approximately -8 seats per $1/gallon. 
 
The change in aircraft size across airports ranged from 5.2% to 8.7%. The average reduction in aircraft 
size was -7.5%, with a median reduction of -7.7%. ORD (-8.7%), SFO (-8.4%) and PHL(-8.3%) 
experienced the largest reductions. LGA (-5.2%) experienced the least reduction in aircraft size. 
 
The change in fuel price has no effect on the frequency of service. The average change in frequency of 
service in -0.3% (min -0.2%, max -2%). JFK (-2%), SFO (-1.6%), LGA (-1.5%) and LGA (-1.4%) 
experienced the largest reductions in frequency. PHL (-0.2%), ORD (-0.3%), and EWR(-0.4%) 
experienced the least reduction in frequency. 
 
AVERAGE AIRCRAFT 
SIZE                 
  BOS DFW EWR JFK LGA ORD PHL SFO 8 AIRPORTS 
$2  111 110 97 118 89 107 100 115 105.9 
$3  103 99 86 106 82 97 89 104 95.8 
$4  93 90 79 98 77 85 80 94 87.0 
$5  88 85 74 94 75 79 75 86 82.0 
Change in average 
A/C size for 
+$1/gal increase -7.67 -8.33 -7.67 -8.00 -4.67 -9.33 -8.33 -9.67 -7.96 
% Change in 
average A.C size 
for a +$1/gal 
increase 6.9 7.6 7.9 6.8 5.2 8.7 8.3 8.4 7.5 
Table 19: Change in Average Aircraft Size across all 8 airports for fuel price increasing from 
$2 to $5/gallon 
 
FLIGHTS PER MARKET 
              
  BOS DFW EWR JFK LGA ORD PHL SFO 8 AIRPORTS 
$2  11.47 12.78 10.14 13.00 13.78 14.76 12.03 12.98 12.62 
$3  11.65 12.88 10.08 12.92 14.51 14.77 11.95 12.64 12.68 
$4  11.84 12.68 10.08 12.42 14.31 14.66 12.03 12.53 12.57 
$5  11.93 12.41 10.00 12.21 14.39 14.64 12.10 12.34 12.50 
Change in markets 
merved for 
+$1/gal increase 0.15 -0.12 -0.05 -0.26 0.20 -0.04 0.03 -0.21 -0.04 
% Change in 
markets served for 
a +$1/gal increase 1.4 1.0 0.4 2.0 1.5 0.3 0.2 1.6 0.3 
Table 20: Change in flights-per-market for 8 airports for fuel price increasing from $2 to 
$5/gallon 
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The changes in frequency of service are a result of the combination of a reductions in flights per day 
(Table 21) and markets served (Table 22). In both cases, the system is robust to fuel prices, experiencing 
a reduction in markets served across all eight airports of -1.1%, and flights per day of -1.4%.  
 
The smaller aircraft result in a significant reduction of fuel burn (-8.3 % per $1/gallon increase) and the 
resulting emissions (Table 23). ORD (-9.5% per $1/gallon increase) experienced the greatest reduction in 
daily fuel burn. BOS (-5.6% per $1/gallon increase) experienced the least reduction in daily fuel burn. 
 
FLIGHTS PER 
DAY                   
  BOS DFW EWR JFK LGA ORD PHL SFO 8 AIRPORTS 
$2  734 1546 750 624 882 1978 962 688 8164 
$3  734 1520 736 620 856 1965 956 670 8057 
$4  734 1496 726 596 830 1950 938 664 7934 
$5  716 1464 720 586 820 1918 932 654 7810 
Change in 
flights/day for 
+$1/gal increase -6.00 
-
27.33 
-
10.00 
-
12.67 
-
20.67 
-
20.00 -10.00 -11.33 -118.00 
% Change in pax 
trips per day for a 
+$1/gal increase 0.8 1.8 1.3 2.0 2.3 1.0 1.0 1.6 1.4 
Table 21: Change in flights-per-day for 8 airports for fuel price increasing from $2 to 
$5/gallon 
 
 
MARKETS SERVED 
        
 
BOS DFW EWR JFK LGA ORD PHL SFO 8 AIRPORTS 
$2 64 121 74 48 64 134 80 53 638 
$3 63 118 73 48 59 133 80 53 627 
$4 62 118 72 48 58 133 78 53 622 
$5 60 118 72 48 57 131 77 53 616 
Change in markets 
served for +$1/gal 
increase 
-
1.33 -1.00 -0.67 0.00 -2.33 -1.00 -1.00 0.00 -7.33 
% Change in 
markets served for 
a +$1/gal increase 2.1 0.8 0.9 0.0 3.6 0.7 1.3 0.0 1.1 
Table 22: Change in markets served for 8 airports for fuel price increasing from $2 to 
$5/gallon 
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DAILY FUEL 
BURN (Million 
Gallons)                   
  BOS DFW EWR JFK LGA ORD PHL SFO 8 AIRPORTS 
$2  1.44 2.51 1.31 1.38 1 3.19 1.31 1.65 13.79 
$3  1.41 2.22 1.15 1.23 0.88 2.9 1.16 1.45 12.4 
$4  1.3 1.98 1.06 1.12 0.83 2.48 1.03 1.33 11.13 
$5  1.2 1.84 1 1.06 0.78 2.28 0.97 1.21 10.34 
Change in daily 
fuel burn for 
+$1/gal increase 
-
0.08 -0.22 -0.10 -0.11 -0.07 -0.30 -0.11 -0.15 -1.15 
% Change in daily 
fuel burn for a 
+$1/gal increase 5.6 8.9 7.9 7.7 7.3 9.5 8.7 8.9 8.3 
Table 23: Change in fuel burn for 8 airports for fuel price increasing from $2 to $5/gallon 
 
4.3 Effects of Increased Flight capacity (4 operations per hour) on Airline 
Behavior 
The effect of an increase in flight capacity of 4 operations per hour (i.e. 72 operations per day) across all 8 
airports is described in this section. The cost of fuel is $2/gallon. 
 
An increase in flight capacity does not affect the airline “economic operating point.” An increase in flight 
capacity does allows less profitable flights, that would otherwise fail to meet the minimum profit 
threshold given the limited flight capacity, to be included. The effect of increasing the number of flights 
(Table 24), directly increases the number of markets served (Table 25), the number of passenger trips 
(Table 26), the airline profit (Table 27), and the daily fuel burn (Table 28). The effect of increasing the 
number of flights, adds to the tails of the distributions causing a shift in the means for airfare (Table 29), 
aircraft size (Table 30). 
 
 
FLIGHTS PER DAY 
  BOS DFW EWR JFK LGA ORD PHL SFO 8 AIRPORTS 
Unconstrained 734 1,546 750 624 882 1,978 962 688 8,164 
MVFR 730 1,546 738 610 882 1,882 896 688 7,972 
IFR 604 1,374 651 540 882 1,696 852 684 7,283 
Change in 
flights/day for 
increase in +1  
ops/hr 
3.25
0 2.688 4.125 3.500 0.000 8.813 4.583 0.167 3.552 
% Change in pax 
trips/day for 
increase in +1 
ops/hr 0.54 0.20 0.63 0.65 0.00 0.52 0.54 0.02 0.05 
Table 24: Change in flights per day for 8 airports for increase of +4 ops/hr 
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The increase in flight capacity enables an increase in the number of flights. Each individual market, 
serving the focus airport, competes for flight slots at the focus airport. The most profitable flights are 
included. Overall, a change in 1 operation/hour across all eight airports results in an increase on average 
of 3.5 flights per day. In some cases, not all the available slots are used as the markets fail to be able to 
generate profitable flights due to small market size, airfare sensitivity, and/or relatively high costs of 
service. 
 
Based on the market size and airfare sensitivity coefficients, Boston, Newark, JKF, Chicago and 
Philadelphia all benefited from increased caapcity. The impact on LaGuardia, Dallas-Fort Worth and San 
Fransisco was less dramatic. According to the market size and airfare sensitivity parameters used, these 
non-capped airports are already serving the available profitable demand. 
 
The added flight capacity increases the frequency of service to existing markets as well as enables a few 
new markets to be serviced (Table 25). On average, approximately three markets to each focus airport 
would be added by a 72 ops/day increase. Boston and Chicago add the most markets. San Fransisco and 
LaGuardia, already servicing profitable markets, did not add any new markets. 
 
MARKETS SERVED 
 
BOS DFW EWR JFK LGA ORD PHL SFO 8 AIRPORTS 
Unconstrained 64 121 74 48 64 134 80 53 638 
MVFR 64 121 73 48 64 134 80 53 637 
IFR 60 117 72 47 64 130 79 53 627 
Change in markets 
served  for increase 
in +1  ops/hr 0.10 0.06 0.08 0.04 0.00 0.13 0.04 0 0.04 
% Change in 
markets served for 
increase in +1 
ops/hr 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.1 0 0.0 
Table 25: Change in markets served for 8 airports for increase of +4 ops/hr 
 
Additional flight capacity increased the number of passengers able to travel (Table 26). On average an 
additional 256 passengers were transported at each of the eight airports (0.049% of the total passengers). 
JFK, Philadelphia, Newark and Boston experienced the most gains in passenger trips.. San Fransisco and 
LaGuardia, already servicing profitable markets, did not see a big gain in passenger trips. 
 
Additional flight capacity, leading to additional flights, has marginal benefits to the airlines (Table 27). 
The additonal flights are, by definition, low profit flights and make only a small contribution to the airline 
bottom-line. Airlines operating at JFK and Philadelphia benefit the most from the additional flight 
capacity.  
 
The additional flight capacity, leading to additional flights, results in a slight increase in daily fuel-burn 
and associated emissions (Table 28). The additional flights, capturing smaller markets, tend to be smaller, 
more fuel efficient aircraft, resulting in a small increase to total fuel burn. Flights operating at Newark, 
JFK, Boston, and Chicago generate the most fuel burn. 
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PAX TRIPS PER DAY 
          BOS DFW EWR JFK LGA ORD PHL SFO 8 AIRPORTS 
Unconstrained 68126 140542 61730 61134 64832 169880 80000 63200 8,164 
MVFR 68852 140542 61194 59584 64832 166800 77714 63240 7,972 
IFR 63780 134702 57874 54118 64832 160280 76122 63120 7,283 
Change in pax 
trips/day for an 
increase of  +1 
ops/hr 109 91 161 292 0 300 162 3 4 
% Change in pax 
trips/day for an 
increase of +1 
ops/hr 0.170 0.068 0.278 0.540 0.000 0.187 0.212 0.005 0.049 
Table 26: Change in passenger trips for 8 airports for increase of +4 ops/hr 
 
 
DAILY AIRLINE PROFITS ($M)               
  BOS DFW EWR JFK LGA ORD PHL SFO 8 AIRPORTS 
Unconstrained 5.4 9.5 5.2 4.5 4.9 11.7 4.7 5.7 51.6 
MVFR 5.4 9.5 5.2 4.4 4.9 11.6 4.6 5.7 51.3 
IFR 5.2 9.3 5.1 4.1 4.9 11.4 4.5 5.6 50.1 
Change in daily 
profit for +$1/gal 
increase 0.005 0.003 0.004 0.017 0.000 0.009 0.008 0.004 0.006 
% Change in daily 
profits for a 
+$1/gal increase 0.093 0.033 0.080 0.370 0.000 0.080 0.177 0.073 0.012 
Table 27: Change in Airline Profits for 8 airports for increase of +4 ops/hr 
 
 
DAILY FUEL 
BURN (Million 
Gallons)                   
  BOS DFW EWR JFK LGA ORD PHL SFO 8 AIRPORTS 
Unconstrained 1.44 2.51 1.31 1.38 1 3.19 1.31 1.65 13.79 
MVFR 1.46 2.51 1.3 1.35 1 3.16 1.29 1.65 13.72 
IFR 1.37 2.44 1.25 1.26 1 3.07 1.28 1.65 13.32 
Change in daily 
fuel burn for an 
increase of 1 
ops/hr 0.002 0.001 0.003 0.005 0.000 0.004 0.001 0.000 0.002 
% Change in daily 
fuel burn for an 
increase of 1 
ops/hr 0.128 0.045 0.200 0.397 0.000 0.122 0.098 0.000 0.014 
Table 28: Daily Fuel-burn for 8 airports for increase of +4 ops/hr 
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The additional flight capacity, leading to additional flights, results in a slight decrease in average airfare 
(Table 29). The additonal flights, capturing smaller markets with lower airfares, add to the tails of the 
airfare distribution. Newark and JFK experienced the largest increase in airfares. 
 
AVERAGE AIRFARE 
        
 
BOS DFW EWR JFK LGA ORD PHL SFO 8 AIRPORTS 
Unconstrained 136 131 160 152 132 135 117 180 142.88 
MVFR 135 131 161 153 132 136 118 180 143.13 
IFR 138 133 164 156 132 138 119 180 145.00 
Change in 
Average Airfare 
for  an increase in 
1 ops/hr 0.050 0.031 0.167 0.167 0.000 0.094 0.083 0.000 0.009 
% Change in 
Average Airfare 
for an increase of 
1 ops/hr 0.036 0.023 0.102 0.107 0.000 0.068 0.070 0.000 0.006 
Table 29: Average Airfare for 8 airports for increase of +4 ops/hr 
The additional flight capacity, leading to additional flights, results in a slight decrease in average aircraft 
size (Table 30). The additional flights, capturing smaller markets, add to the tails of the aircraft size 
distribution. Newark, Philadelphia, Chicago, and Boston experienced the largest growth in average 
aircraft size. 
 
AVERAGE AIRCRAFT 
SIZE                 
  BOS DFW EWR JFK LGA ORD PHL SFO 8 AIRPORTS 
Unconstrained 111 110 97 118 89 107 100 115 105.9 
MVFR 113 110 98 118 89 111 105 105 106.1 
IFR 126 119 105 121 89 118 108 115 112.6 
Change in average 
aircraft size for 
increase in 1 
ops/hr 0.375 0.141 0.333 0.125 0.000 0.344 0.333 0.000 0.027 
% Change in 
average aircraft 
aize for increase 
in 1 ops/hr 0.298 0.118 0.317 0.103 0.000 0.291 0.309 0.000 0.024 
Table 30: Aircraft Size for 8 airports for increase of +4 ops/hr 
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5 CONCLUSIONS 
There are two independent phenomena that determine the markets served, the schedule, and the size of 
aircraft: aircraft cost of operation (e.g. fuel price) and capacity at the focus airport. 
 
The cost of operation of each aircraft size in the fleet, in conjunction with the demand in each service 
period of the day (i.e. market size and airfare sensitivity), determine the number of flights per day from a 
given market and the size of aircraft assigned. These candidates flights for service to/from the focus 
airport determine the potential revenue, costs and profit generated by providing the air transport service. 
In the absence of changes in demand, changes in aircraft performance (e.g. fuel price, block hours, fuel-
burn-rates) will affect the frequency of service and size of aircraft. For example, in markets with near 
appropriate profiles of demand by time of day, economies-of-scale in operating costs for larger aircraft 
would have the effect of maintining seat throughput by upgauging while flying reduced frequency. This 
phenomenon effectively shifts the the economic operating point for each flight for each market, resulting 
in new revenue, airfares, costs, and profit. 
 
Flight capacity at the focus airports does not change the the economic operating point. Adding flight 
capacity allows the less profitable flights, that were previously ranked to low access to the focus airport. 
Likewise reducing flight capacity eliminates the lowest ranking by profit flights. Revenue, airfares, costs, 
and profit on each flight remain unchanged.  
 
Whereas flight capacity changes the threshold for profit for a flight serving the focus airport, aircraft 
performance shifts the economics of the industry. 
 
The effects of the two treatments evaluated using the AFRS-OM are summarized in Table 31. The table 
shows the change in each parameter for an increase in $1 per gallon, and the change in each parameter for 
+4 operations/hour (72 ops/daty) increase in flight capacity.  
 
 Metrics Increase +$1/gallon Increase in +4 ops/hour 
Flights per Day -1.4% 0.05% 
Markets Served -1.1% Unchanged 
Pax Trips per Day -8.7% +0.05% 
Average Airfare ($) +$34 +0.006% 
Airline Profits ($M) +3.2% +0.12% 
Average Aircraft Size (Seats per Aircraft) -7.5% +0.024% 
Daily Fuel Burn (M gallons) -8.3% +0.014% 
Table 31: Comparison of the change in each ATS metric for an increase of $0.08 in hedged 
fuel price, and an increase in +4 operations/hour. 
Changes in airport capacity limits (within the range studied) do not have significant negative effects on 
either markets served or on airfares charged. As capacity limits are lifted (i.e. +4 operations per hour), the 
number of markets served is remains constant, scheduled flights per day to all markets is increased by a 
small percent (0.05%), average revenue per seat is increased, average aircraft size is increased, and daily 
airline profits are increased slightly. 
 
Overall, the airline transportation system is relatively sensitive to changes in the cost of aircraft operation 
(e.g. fuel price). As the cost of operation increases, geographic access (i.e. markets served, -1.1%) and 
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frequency of service (-1.4%) are reduced. However, due to increases in airfares ($34 for every $1/gallon 
increase in hedged fuel price), fewer passengers (-8.9% per $1/gallon increase) are transported in smaller 
aircraft (-7.5% per $1/gallon increase). This has no effect on congestion (-1.4% reduction in flights per 
day per $1/gallon increase), but a significant reduction in fuel burn (-8.3% per $1/gallon increase). 
 
It should be noted that in certain specific circumstances (e.g. constant demand), the effect of efforts to 
increase flight capacity (i.e. NextGen, AIP), can be nullified by a sustained fuel price increase. 
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Abstract 
 
Researchers are applying more holistic approaches to the feedback control of the air transportation 
system. Many of these approaches rely on economic feedback, including the cost of delays to the airlines. 
Establishing an accurate mechanism for estimating the cost of delays for each portion of a flight (gate 
costs, taxiing in and out costs, and en-route costs) is useful for many aspects of modeling airline behavior 
and for better understanding the likely impact of regulations.  
 
EuroControl (2004) developed a rigorous methodology and collected data for estimating the components 
of airline delay costs for various segments of a scheduled flight. The model, based on confidential 
information from European airlines for twelve types of aircraft circa 2003, was not transparent with 
regards to how each of the major components of cost (crew costs, fuel costs, maintenance, depreciation, 
etc) impacted that total. This paper describes the development of an airline cost model, based on the 
Eurocontrol model. The airline cost model explicitly identifies the components of airline costs, is based 
on U.S. airline cost data, and includes 111 aircraft types. The new model is designed to allow costs to be 
updated whenever any of the factors (e.g. crew, fuel, maintenance, and ground costs) change.  It considers 
the type of the aircraft when making calculations, both from the perspective of fuel burn and passenger 
costs. A case-study analysis of airline costs of operation at 12 major U.S. airports is provided.  
 
Keywords-component; airline delay costs; airline delays; economic modeling of airlines 
 
 
Introduction 
 
The airline industry moves millions of passengers and tons of cargo annually.  Recent studies have 
estimated the cost of delays to the U.S. economy in 2007 ranging from $32.9 billion [NEXTOR, 2010] to 
$41 billion [JEC 2008]. Researchers have proposed holistic approaches to incentivize the development of 
increased capacity and improved productivity [Donohue et. al., 2008; Ball et. al., 2007] and feedback 
control of the air transportation system [NextGen, 2008; Xiong, 2010; Rupp, 2005]. These approaches 
rely on economic feedback, including the cost of delays to the airlines. An accurate model of the cost of a 
delay is not only of interest to the airlines that incur these costs, but is essential for air transportation 
policy, management, and control. 
 
Direct costs are accrued by airlines when flights are delayed. There are two main causes of flight delays: 
(1) the flight does not depart due to aircraft or flight specific reasons (e.g. mechanical problems, 
misaligned crew or aircraft, crew work rules), or (2) mismatch between demand and capacity. At several 
highly utilized airports, systemic over-scheduling and reductions in capacity of both the airspace and the 
runways due to weather result in delayed flights. Based on weather forecasts and schedules, air traffic 
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management estimates the resulting reduction in capacity within various segments of the airspace and at a 
variety of airports. It announces Ground Delay Programs (GDPs) that hold aircraft at the departing 
airport, in order to have the flying aircraft better match the capacity of the system. For capacity reduction 
in air, Air Flow Programs (AFPs) are employed that suggest/announce alternative routes for the flights. 
Since holding aircraft at a gate is both cheaper and safer than airborne holds, most delays are gate holds.  
Delays often propagate through the system, causing future delays, because the aircraft or crews may not 
arrive at their next assignment in time to allow the next flight to leave on time.  
 
The Performance Review Unit, EuroControl published a report [EuroControl, 2004] describing a 
methodology for evaluating true cost of flight delays. The methodology presents results detailing the cost 
to airlines of delays during various segments of a scheduled flight.  The costs are divided into short delays 
(less than 15 minutes) and long delays (greater than 65 minutes). The report provides a cost factor (Euros 
per minute) for each flight segment.  The types of delays considered include gate delay, access to runway 
delay (both taxi in and out delays), en-route delays, and landing delays (circling or longer flight paths to 
overcome congestion while approaching the airport).  The data used in the study consisted of data 
collected from European airlines, air traffic management as well as interviews and surveys conducted by 
the research team. Although each of the factors making up the overall cost factors are explained, the 
individual factors are not provided because the information was considered proprietary.  In the absence of 
this transparency, the factors provided prohibit the separation of fuel costs from crew or maintenance 
costs and prohibit an update of the summary factors when any of these costs change or when alternative 
aircraft need to be considered. Furthermore, the model is based on data from EU airlines for 12 aircraft 
types. 
 
The motivation of this paper is therefore to: 
 
 identify coefficients for the cost factors 
 model each of the individual coefficients and cost factors 
 update model with publicly available costs of U.S. airlines  
 extend the fleet mix to over 100 aircraft types 
 structure the model to enable update of the data over various time periods 
This paper is organized as follows. Section II describes the EC report, Section III provides the 
methodology for determining the cost components and multipliers that make up the final multipliers used 
in the EuroControl report and describe the validation of the new model on European data from the period 
of the EC report.  In Section IV and V, delay costs are examined for US airline departures from 12 major 
airports (EWR, JFK, LGA, DCA, BWI, IAD, SFO, OAK, SFO, BOS, PHL, DFW) for one of the busiest 
months in US aviation history (July, 2007). Delays by segment of flight, by aircraft type, by airline and 
by hour of day are examined in this case study. Section VI provides conclusions and Section VII points 
out the future research.   
 
 
EuroControl Performance Review Unit Report (EC report) 
 
The EC report specifies that delays incurred can be of two types: tactical delay and strategic delay. The 
report makes the distinction between tactical delays (delays encountered that are greater than the 
announced schedule, i.e. delays above the anticipated padding of the schedule) and strategic delays (i.e. 
the delay relative to an unpadded schedule).  Both US and European airlines increase the arrival time over 
unimpeded time so that they can report “on time” performance even when the system is over-capacitated. 
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Another distinction that the report makes is between gate-to-gate (or single flight) delays and network-
level delays. The gate-to-gate delay is the delay that an individual flight incurs based on the environment 
it encounters, while the network delays are the effects that the flight causes to the rest of the network. The 
cost of delay discussed in the EC report is the tactical primary delay.  In the report, two types of delays 
have been chosen for demonstration: delays of short duration (15 minutes or less) and delays of long 
duration (65 minutes or more).  Similarly three cost scenarios have been used to “allow more realistic 
ranges of values”.   
 
The EC report describes the model as an additive model where each component defines a proportion of 
the total cost. Table A - 1 shows the cost factors included as inputs in these cost scenarios under different 
delay characteristics. For example, to estimate the delay costs for a short delay (15 mins) for a baseline 
airline, the factors in column 3 are multiplied to the delays and the respective cost factors for each flight 
segment, and then added together. For details, see [EuroControl, 2004].  Figure A - 1 details the inputs 
and outputs of their model.   
 
 
Table A - 1. Low, base and high cost scenarios (from Table 2-5 of [EuroControl, 2004]) 
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Figure A - 1. EuroControl (EC) Model 
Further exploring their cost factors reveals the following costs involved: 
 
Fuel cost: The report provides different fuel burn rates for each aircraft type studied and for all segments 
of the flights. The prices for all cost scenarios and conversion rates from Euro to Dollars are also 
provided. (See Table 2-12 and Annex C in [EuroControl, 2004]). 
 
Extra Crew cost: The report defines extra crew cost as the extra cost paid in addition to the usual flight 
and cabin crew salaries and expenses.  It may include employing additional crew (both flight and cabin 
crew) or incurring additional pay for regular crews due to unexpected increases in hours worked. The 
report does not specify exactly the methodologies used to obtain the crew cost component of the 
multiplier in order to preserve confidentiality of airline data. However, the report describes under what 
circumstances the cost factors will be increased (refer to Table A - 1 of this paper). 
 
Maintenance cost: The maintenance cost is defined to be the cost of maintaining both the airframe and 
power plant of the aircraft. The additional maintenance cost incurred for a one-minute delay is stated in 
the report as approximately 15% of the Block Hour Direct Operating Cost (BHDOC). The proportions of 
how maintenance cost is divided into different segments of the flights are given in Annex J of 
[Eurocontrol, 2004]. BHDOC’s are given in the report for low, base and high cost scenarios for the 12 
different aircraft systems studied (see Table 2-11 in [EuroControl, 2004]).  
 
Depreciation Cost:  The report assumes that there is no additional depreciation cost caused by delays.  
Thus, the depreciation component of total delay is taken to be zero for all segments and cost scenarios. 
 
 
EC Additive 
Model 
(Black Box) 
Inputs: 
- Fuel Price 
- Fuel Burn 
Rates 
- Maintenance 
Cost 
- Crew Cost 
- PAX Delay 
Cost 
- Load Factors 
- Other Costs 
(DRL, Airport 
Charges etc.) 
Outputs: 
Cost of 
Delay 
Factors 
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Passenger Delay Cost: Passenger Delay cost (or PAX delay cost) is defined as the compensation paid by 
the airlines to passengers who have experienced delayed flights. Passenger Delay (in cost per passenger 
per minute) is given as: zero for low and base cost scenarios, 0.05 for the high cost scenario for 15 
minutes of delay and 0.32, 0.40 and 0.48 for low, base and high cost scenarios respectively for 65 minutes 
delay. The load factors assumed are: 50% for low, 70% for base and 90% for high cost scenarios. 
 
Other Costs: This factor is a catch-all component that attempts to include any other cost factors mentioned 
in Table A - 1 (such as parking, airport charges, handling agent penalty, weight payload factor etc.). No 
specific cost factors were given in the report, except details for different Airport charges at different EU 
airports (see Annex L in [EuroControl, 2004]). 
 
Based on the analysis done, the EC report provides cost of delay factors (in Euros). The delay is divided 
into three segments of the flight; delay on the ground at the gate (Table A - 2), delay while taxiing at 
either airport (Table A - 3) or delay while airborne (en-route and holding, Table A - 4). These segments 
were chosen for discussion because they reflect the fidelity of publically available data. 
 
One point worth mentioning is that the findings of the report are for EU airports only.  However, when 
applying the formulas to US data, the differences between the US and European system must be 
recognized.  For example, passenger compensation costs incurred to the airline in US are far lower than 
that of EU (due to EU Passenger Bill of Rights or PBR). Similarly, aircraft spend more time taxiing out in 
the US than in Europe.  Also, in the US, Air Traffic Management imposes greater ground delay programs 
in order to assure that there is little circling at the destination airport.  The EC report specifically 
comments on this difference noting that, on average, the amount of en-route delay is greater than the 
amount of ground delay for European flights.  
 
 
 
Table A - 2. Tactical ground delay costs: at-gate only (without network effects)  
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Table A - 3. Tactical ground delay costs: taxi-only (without network effects) 
 
Table A - 4. Tactical airborne delay costs and holding (without network effects) 
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Methodology 
 
Regenerating the EC Model 
This analysis starts with a similar additive general model for each of the different segments paired with 
the different cost scenarios that include all the different cost factors.  Due to the fidelity of the available 
US data, the flights are divided into three segments; gate, taxi and en-route (which includes both airborne 
and holding).  For each of these segments, three cost scenarios and two range delays are provided, hence 
for each of these 18 different cases (segments x cost scenarios x delay ranges) are modeled: 
 
             fuel burn rate  fuel price   
       crew cost 
              maintenance cost 
         other cost 
       PA  delay cost  (  seats)   l oad factor 
 
Table A - 5 shows the elements of the EU cost of delay model.  The elements highlighted in green were 
provided for all 18 scenarios and 12 aircraft in the report.  The elements highlighted in yellow were 
assumptions made for this analysis or derived inputs from 2003 BTS data.  Lastly, the elements 
highlighted in red were derived from fitting this model to the 216 data points (18 scenarios x 12 aircraft). 
 
 
Table A - 5. Elements of EU Cost of Delay Model 
 
Source Gate Delay Cost Taxi Delay Cost Airborne Delay Cost
Fuel Burn Coefficient Assumed 0 1 1
Taxi Burn Rate EU Report N/A given N/A
Burn Rate EU Report N/A N/A given
Fuel Cost per Gallon EU Report N/A given given
Crew Coefficient Not provided
% of BHDOC BTS (2003) 28% 28% 28%
BHDOC EU Report given given given
Maint Coefficient Not provided
% of BHDOC BTS (2003) 15% 15% 15%
BHDOC EU Report given given given
Pax Coefficient Assumed 1 1 1
Seats per aircraft EU Report given given given
Load Factor EU Report given given given
Pax Cost per minute EU Report given given given
Fuel Burn Coefficient Not provided
Other Cost per minute Assumed $1 $1 $1
FU
E
L
C
re
w
P
A
X
O
th
e
r
M
a
in
t
Identified in this analysis
Identified in this analysis
Identified in this analysis
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While the percentage of the Block Hour Direct Operating Costs (BHDOC) was provided for maintenance 
in the EU report, the percentage of the BHDOC was not provided for crew.  Therefore, the same 
percentage of crew costs for European and US BHDOCs are assumed.  Table A - 6 shows the 2003 BTS 
percentages for BHDOC for fuel, crew, maintenance, and depreciation.  These percentages were 
normalized for the given 15% of BHDOC for maintenance, given in the EU report.  Thus, 28% of 
BHDOC for crew costs is assumed for this analysis. 
 
 
Table A - 6. 2003 BTS % of BHDOC 
Fitting the EU Model to find unknown coefficients 
Microsoft Solver was used to find the crew, maintenance and the other cost factors coefficients for each 
segment, each cost scenario and each delay range (3x3x2).  The sum of the squared difference between 
EU report delay cost factors for the 12 aircraft versus the fitted model’s cost facts were minimized to find 
the best fit for each segment.  The coefficients were constrained to be positive, larger or equal to 
coefficients for each lower cost scenario and larger or equal to coefficients for each lower delay range.  
The results of these fits are shown in Table A - 7, the new derived coefficients are shown in blue. 
 
Fuel % crew % maint % dep %
2003 data 41% 25% 22% 11%
normalized for 
15% maint
45% 28% 15% 12%
BTS BHDOC for 
12 aircraft
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Table A - 7. Fitted Coefficients for Crew, Maintenance and Other Costs 
Table A - 8 shows the goodness of fit of the new derived model compared to the EU Delay cost factors by 
aircraft type, segment, cost scenario and delay range.  Values highlighted in green were overestimated by 
the new model by more than 10% and values highlighted in red were underestimated by more than 10%.  
These aircraft represent 28% of the US domestic operations from 2005 to 2009. 
 
low base high low base high
Fuel -           -           -           -           -           -           
Crew 0.03         0.03         0.33         0.03         0.46         1.07         
Maint 0.00         0.00         0.00         0.00         0.00         0.00         
Pax 1.00         1.00         1.00         1.00         1.00         1.00         
Other 0.21         0.21         0.21         0.21         0.21         0.21         
low base high low base high
Fuel 1.00         1.00         1.00         1.00         1.00         1.00         
Crew -           0.00         0.26         -           0.43         1.01         
Maint 0.00         0.00         0.00         -           0.00         0.00         
Pax 1.00         1.00         1.00         1.00         1.00         1.00         
Other 0.12         0.12         0.12         0.12         0.12         0.12         
low base high low base high
Fuel 1.00         1.00         1.00         1.00         1.00         1.00         
Crew -           0.01         0.29         -           0.46         1.09         
Maint 0.00         0.00         0.00         0.00         0.00         -           
Pax 1.00         1.00         1.00         1.00         1.00         1.00         
Other 0.10         0.10         0.10         0.10         0.10         0.10         
Airborne: 
Cost Factor 
Coefficients
Based on 15 min. delay Based on 65 min. delay
cost scenario cost scenario
Based on 65 min. delay
cost scenario cost scenario
Taxi: Cost 
Factor 
Coefficients
Based on 15 min. delay Based on 65 min. delay
cost scenario cost scenario
Gate: Cost 
Factor 
Coefficients
Based on 15 min. delay
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Table A - 8. Percentage Difference of model versus EU Report factors 
 
low base high low base high
ATR42 46 -2% -7% -12% 0% -6% -9% 0%
ATR72 64 4% 1% -1% 0% -1% -2% 0%
B737-500 100 -14% -14% -10% -2% -2% -3% 3%
B737-300 125 -12% -13% -6% -1% 1% 1% 2%
A319 126 12% 9% 8% 1% 4% 4% 1%
B737-400 143 -10% -11% -4% -1% 1% 1% 7%
A320 155 5% 3% 4% 1% 1% 3% 5%
A321 166 0% -2% 4% 0% 3% 5% 1%
B737-800 174 13% 8% 5% 1% -1% 1% 5%
B757-200 218 10% 8% 8% 1% 3% 4% 4%
B767-300ER 240 12% 10% 7% 1% 0% 3% 0%
B747-400 406 21% 21% 4% 2% -1% -7% 0%
low base high low base high
ATR42 46 -10% -11% -16% 0% -7% -12% 0%
ATR72 64 6% -3% -4% 0% -1% -3% 0%
B737-500 100 9% 6% -1% 1% 0% -2% 3%
B737-300 125 9% 6% 5% 2% 3% 3% 2%
A319 126 1% -3% 4% 0% 3% 4% 1%
B737-400 143 9% 4% 4% 0% 2% 2% 7%
A320 155 1% -1% 3% 1% 0% 4% 5%
A321 166 2% -2% 7% 0% 4% 5% 1%
B737-800 174 13% 8% 1% 1% -1% 0% 5%
B757-200 218 6% 3% 5% 0% 3% 4% 4%
B767-300ER 240 11% 5% 2% 1% -1% 2% 0%
B747-400 406 13% 13% -7% 1% -2% -7% 0%
low base high low base high
ATR42 46 1% -7% -19% 0% -7% -13% 0%
ATR72 64 -10% 7% -7% 0% -1% -4% 0%
B737-500 100 -7% 5% -4% 0% -1% -3% 3%
B737-300 125 -7% 0% 6% 1% 2% 3% 2%
A319 126 -4% 4% 8% 0% 4% 4% 1%
B737-400 143 2% 5% 5% -1% 2% 2% 7%
A320 155 -3% -3% 8% 0% 0% 5% 5%
A321 166 -8% 0% 11% 0% 4% 6% 1%
B737-800 174 1% -4% 0% 0% -2% 0% 5%
B757-200 218 11% 4% 5% 0% 3% 4% 4%
B767-300ER 240 28% 5% 0% 0% -2% 2% 0%
B747-400 406 -24% -23% -25% -1% -4% -9% 0%
Tactical ground delay costs: at-gate only (% Diff from EU Report)
% of US 
Domestic 
operations 
(2005-2009)
% of US 
Domestic 
operations 
(2005-2009)
% of US 
Domestic 
operations 
(2005-2009)
Tactical ground delay costs: taxi only (% Diff from EU Report)
Aircraft and 
Number of seats
Based on 15 min. delay Based on 65 min. delay
cost scenario cost scenario
Tactical Airborne Delay Costs enroute and holding (% Diff from EU Report)
Aircraft and 
Number of seats
Based on 15 min. delay Based on 65 min. delay
cost scenario cost scenario
Aircraft and 
Number of seats
Based on 15 min. delay Based on 65 min. delay
cost scenario cost scenario
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Examination of this data shows that the model fits the data especially well for all long delays (over 65 
minutes).  It also fits well for taxiing out and at-gate delays.  For both the baseline and high cost 
scenarios, the taxiing out delays fit all but the very largest and smallest aircraft which compose only 1% 
of the flights in the US.  These estimates do show a significant discrepancy for the low scenario for large 
aircraft while airborne.  However, this low-cost scenario would not be recommended for use in the 
described modeling efforts and in all other cases, the data match very well the Eurocontrol factors.  
 
Chi square goodness of fit tests were done to examine statistically how well these derived coefficients fit 
the EU report factors, and are shown in Table A - 9.  All cost scenarios were examined for airborne, taxi 
and gate delay cost factors.  The chi square results showed 99.8% or better confidence that the model fit 
the original EU report factors for all cost scenario and segments.  
 
 
Table A - 9. Chi Square fit of Delay Cost Model versus EU report Factors 
Modify Model for US Data 
To apply this model to the US data, the following changes are made that are more consistent to the US 
airlines.  
 
Cost factors derived from the BTS P52 database (fuel price, crew and maintenance cost) [BTS 2003 & 
2007] are used. 
 
The fuel burn rate while en route from the BTS P52 database is used.  And taxi burn rates, derived from 
the ICAO engine emissions databank are used. (See ICAO report, 2009). 
 
The PAX delay cost coefficient is set to 0, since in the US, it is not incurred by the airlines. 
 
For other delay ranges, the following formulas are used:  
 
For any delay less than or equal to 15 minutes, the 15 minutes cost factor is used.  
 
For any delay above 65 minutes, the cost factor for 65 minutes and above delay is used.   
 
For delays between 15 and 65 minutes, a cost factor is interpolated using the two data points above. 
 
Before beginning the work to determine the cost coefficients for the new model, an examination of 
overall cost factors in the US compared to those incurred in Europe was undertaken.  The delay cost 
factors were computed, based on the EC factors, for the different types of segments (gate, taxi and 
airborne-and-holding) and for the given 12 aircrafts.  These delay cost factors were compared with the 
average operational cost per minute using P52 [BTS, 2003] data from the BTS database for US airlines.  
All Low Base High
71 23 23 23
41.51      8.21         8.21         8.21         
Airborne Statistic 10.81      2.19         3.52         5.10         
Taxi Statistic 5.18         0.41         0.84         3.94         
Gate Statistic 0.84         0.19         0.77         8.16         
Degrees of Freedom
Statistic for 99.8% 
confidence that 
model fits data
Cost ScenarioChi Square 
Goodness of Fit
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Figure A-2, Figure A - 3, and Figure A - 4 show that, in each of these flight segments, the shape of the 
curves are similar, affirming the fact that these cost factors are consistent with the operational costs in the 
US.   These results support the assumption that it is appropriate to use BTS crew cost percentages of 
Block Hour Operating Costs (BHDOC) when calculating total costs.   
 
 
Figure A-2. Tactical Ground Delay costs: gate only (without network effect) vs Operational 
costs 
 
Figure A - 3. Tactical Ground Delay costs: Taxi only (without network effect) vs. Operational 
costs 
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Figure A - 4. Tactical Airborne Delay Costs en-route and holding (without network effect) vs. 
Operational costs 
This paper will next show results from this methodology for computing the operational delay costs using 
the delay cost factors as derived above, for aircraft not described in the EuroControl.  Such aircraft 
represents 72% of aircraft operations in the US.  These factors can be derived for any time period that 
historical BTS cost data is available. 
When using the same model but using fuel burn rates as reported in US databases, the analysis shows that 
fuel burn rates reported in the US are lower than reported in the EC report. This means that even using the 
model postulated in the EC report, US airlines show slightly lower costs for equivalent delays than that of 
the EC report.  Coefficients for the base cost scenario will be used for developing US delay cost factors. 
For the network effect of these delays, the delay multipliers based on American Airlines case study (see 
Beatty, 1998 or Table 2-20 in [Eurocontrol, 2004]) can be used. 
 
 
Results of Case Study 
 
This study examines delay costs for US airline departures from 12 major airports (EWR, JFK, LGA, 
DCA, BWI, IAD, SFO, OAK, SFO, BOS, PHL, DFW) for one of the busiest months in US aviation 
history (July, 2007).    Delays by segment of flight, by aircraft type, by airline and by hour of day are 
examined in this case study.  Table A - 10 show the results of this case study.  
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Table A - 10. July 2007 Departure delays by segment of flight for selected airports 
These Table A - 10esults indicate that even though the majority of delays occur on the ground (87%), the 
airlines incur the greatest delay costs while their flights are airborne (65%). Since a flight delayed in the 
air is twenty times the cost of an aircraft delayed at the gate, there is an economic advantage for airlines to 
hold flights at the origin airports rather than delayed in the air.  
 
Table A - 11 shows the airlines that exceeded one million dollars in delay costs for July 2007 from the 
selected airports in this study.  American Eagle realized the lowest delay costs per flight, largely due to 
their more fuel efficient fleet of CRJ-700s, Embraer ERJ-135/145s, and SAAB 340 turboprops.  Delta 
Airlines, on the other hand, showed the greatest delay costs per flight, mostly due to their less fuel 
efficient fleet. 
 
 
Table A - 11. July 2007 Departure delays for airlines exceeding $1M in delay costs 
 
Table A - 12 shows the aircraft that exceeded one million dollars in delay costs for July 2007 from the 
selected airports for this study.  As shown earlier in Table 10, the fuel efficient Embraer ERJ-135/145s 
showed the lowest delay costs per flight.  However the older less fuel efficient MD88s and B757-200s 
show the greatest delay costs per flight. 
 
Analysis of the airline delay costs by time of day (Table A - 13) shows that average cost of delay per 
flight ramps up from lows in the early morning (5-6am) to a peak between 5-6pm and then begin to 
subside with relatively small costs by 10pm.  The gate delay costs are highest in late afternoon (5-7pm), 
whereas taxi out delays are highest between (4-6pm) and airborne delays are highest in the early mornings 
(6-9am).  Overnight flights can have significant delay costs, but these reflect the few large aircraft flights 
that, when delayed, exhibit these as costly airborne delays. 
 
Gate Delay Taxi out Delay Airborne Delay Taxi in Delay Total Delay
July 2007 Delay costs 8,492,145$   10,754,556$       41,441,667$        3,110,810$          63,799,178$       
Delay cost per flight 30.26$           38.33$                 147.69$                11.09$                   227.37$               
Delay minutes 4,022,321     2,276,214           1,052,131            728,188                8,078,854$         
Delay cost per minute 2.11$              4.72$                    39.39$                  4.27$                     7.90$                    
Airline Gate Delay Taxi out Delay Airborne Delay Taxi in Delay Total Delay # Flights $ per flight
american 1,272,838$ 1,828,159$      5,859,727$        873,476$      9,834,200$ 38,399  256.11$        
southwest 581,768$     581,715$          6,201,624$        229,303$      7,594,410$ 28,722  264.41$        
delta 727,080$     1,215,887$      3,079,572$        290,221$      5,312,760$ 13,233  401.48$        
us airlines 416,258$     892,844$          3,764,669$        196,096$      5,269,868$ 15,129  348.33$        
united 550,133$     1,030,883$      2,945,020$        254,389$      4,780,425$ 19,015  251.40$        
continental 885,487$     1,111,575$      2,341,061$        218,211$      4,556,335$ 14,387  316.70$        
jet blue 626,087$     1,001,468$      2,048,026$        183,966$      3,859,548$ 14,752  261.63$        
northwest 184,893$     364,349$          1,536,632$        99,053$         2,184,927$ 7,048    310.01$        
american eagle 423,625$     376,629$          851,741$            142,279$      1,794,274$ 24,508  73.21$           
air tran 393,055$     287,737$          927,879$            103,138$      1,711,810$ 7,670    223.18$        
air wisconsin 204,604$     133,906$          1,204,321$        28,433$         1,571,264$ 12,259  128.17$        
com air 223,066$     337,824$          939,059$            69,319$         1,569,268$ 8,556    183.41$        
ExpressJet 321,204$     348,175$          586,765$            51,283$         1,307,427$ 11,211  116.62$        
Republic Airlines 131,820$     75,043$            886,370$            16,935$         1,110,167$ 5,147    215.69$        
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Analysis of the airline delay costs for the top 12 markets for delay costs (Table A - 14) shows that parity 
rarely exists between opposite markets.  An extreme case of opposite markets is highlighted in red (JFK-
ANC and ANC-JFK), the average delay costs at these markets varies by $754. Another extreme pair is 
highlighted in green (SFO-LAX and LAX-SFO), because the average delay costs per flight at these 
markets are within $28 of each other. 
 
 
Table A - 12. 3  July 2007 Departure delays for aircraft exceeding $1M in delay costs 
Aircraft Gate Delay Taxi out Delay Airborne Delay Taxi in Delay Total Delay # Flights $ per flight
B752 794,859$   1,435,696$      3,691,511$        444,658$      6,366,725$ 18,662    341.16$        
B737 602,399$   582,814$          4,649,791$        204,566$      6,039,570$ 22,570    267.59$        
MD82 619,102$   895,085$          3,230,645$        455,587$      5,200,419$ 20,840    249.54$        
A320 666,428$   1,315,475$      2,594,288$        294,020$      4,870,211$ 20,241    240.61$        
B733 574,161$   618,854$          3,464,556$        181,687$      4,839,259$ 19,561    247.39$        
A319 308,906$   603,246$          2,826,820$        145,379$      3,884,352$ 14,650    265.14$        
CRJ2 333,964$   333,642$          2,528,964$        78,126$         3,274,695$ 22,824    143.48$        
B738 523,472$   683,996$          1,764,857$        190,269$      3,162,595$ 12,479    253.43$        
E145 542,696$   422,478$          1,808,727$        109,635$      2,883,536$ 23,464    122.89$        
MD88 295,444$   503,327$          1,659,392$        98,798$         2,556,961$ 6,142      416.31$        
E170 189,513$   119,199$          1,321,926$        29,081$         1,659,718$ 7,637      217.33$        
B735 355,881$   430,128$          741,454$            79,724$         1,607,188$ 6,102      263.39$        
MD83 187,480$   233,817$          1,015,068$        119,692$      1,556,057$ 5,900      263.74$        
E190 211,808$   228,699$          1,021,585$        31,092$         1,493,185$ 4,694      318.11$        
E135 256,153$   276,426$          711,110$            63,297$         1,306,986$ 13,355    97.86$           
B712 262,947$   197,903$          700,814$            71,115$         1,232,779$ 6,894      178.82$        
CRJ1 177,892$   252,791$          732,486$            54,852$         1,218,021$ 6,498      187.45$        
B734 120,198$   213,059$          819,107$            54,217$         1,206,580$ 4,268      282.70$        
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Table A - 13. July 2007 Departure delay costs by time of day 
Time of Day Gate Delay Taxi out Delay Airborne Delay Taxi in Delay Total Delay # Flights $ per flight
12-1am 22,765$       14,804$            120,664$            5,632$           163,865$       500          327.73$     
1-2am 12,931$       6,853$              64,375$              3,217$           87,376$          201          434.71$     
2-3am 5,270$          5,212$              52,553$              3,717$           66,751$          118          565.69$     
3-4am 9,587$          13,905$            97,884$              1,881$           123,258$       127          970.53$     
4-5am 11,819$       4,340$              52,281$              1,176$           69,616$          109          638.68$     
5-6am 43,822$       26,166$            304,460$            16,053$         390,500$       2,254      173.25$     
6-7am 120,525$     361,186$          2,990,143$        194,745$      3,666,599$    20,175    181.74$     
7-8am 217,893$     493,522$          3,373,441$        231,127$      4,315,984$    19,756    218.46$     
8-9am 289,591$     784,156$          3,124,226$        215,999$      4,413,972$    20,182    218.71$     
9-10am 259,797$     650,089$          2,511,443$        180,034$      3,601,363$    17,617    204.43$     
10-11am 264,222$     491,762$          2,638,476$        165,847$      3,560,307$    17,238    206.54$     
11-12pm 335,033$     493,040$          2,771,531$        208,298$      3,807,903$    17,859    213.22$     
12-1pm 431,748$     506,069$          2,937,395$        211,522$      4,086,734$    18,161    225.03$     
1-2pm 565,399$     625,994$          2,876,425$        223,525$      4,291,344$    17,660    243.00$     
2-3pm 644,341$     721,229$          2,540,171$        213,641$      4,119,382$    16,385    251.41$     
3-4pm 778,806$     783,087$          2,689,679$        230,410$      4,481,982$    16,913    265.00$     
4-5pm 802,846$     1,047,412$      2,617,860$        212,301$      4,680,419$    18,232    256.71$     
5-6pm 975,523$     1,093,879$      2,637,803$        238,021$      4,945,226$    18,302    270.20$     
6-7pm 813,213$     891,570$          2,105,195$        186,777$      3,996,754$    15,983    250.06$     
7-8pm 754,016$     749,206$          1,773,709$        145,386$      3,422,317$    15,585    219.59$     
8-9pm 584,859$     561,539$          1,317,165$        103,529$      2,567,092$    12,381    207.34$     
9-10pm 343,817$     253,808$          982,618$            59,593$         1,639,837$    8,867      184.94$     
10-11pm 111,404$     117,220$          504,545$            31,724$         764,893$       3,793      201.66$     
11-12am 92,917$       58,507$            357,626$            26,655$         535,705$       2,203      243.17$     
Grand Total 8,492,145$ 10,754,556$    41,441,667$      3,110,810$   63,799,178$ 280,601 227.37$     
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Table A - 14. July 2007 Departure delay costs for top 12 market pair delay costs 
This analysis of the airline delay costs and delays for the top 12 selected airports is shown in Table A - 
15. This analysis shows that average delay costs for departures out of JFK are twice the average delay 
costs of departures from DFW.   
 
 
Table A - 15. July 2007 Departure delay costs and delays for departures from 12 selected 
airports 
Market Gate Delay Taxi out Delay Airborne Delay Taxi in DelayTotal Delay # Flights $ per flight diff
DCA-LGA 14,499$     71,972$            342,688$            4,114$    433,273$   919 471.46$     
LGA-DCA 16,547$     62,979$            169,572$            6,584$    255,682$   920 277.92$     193.55$  
JFK-LAX 43,668$     167,542$          156,062$            26,318$  393,590$   709 555.13$     
LAX-JFK 29,592$     34,487$            273,140$            28,438$  365,657$   715 511.41$     43.73$    
BOS-LGA 22,719$     46,799$            313,541$            5,794$    388,854$   961 404.63$     
LGA-BOS 17,641$     68,828$            241,567$            7,473$    335,509$   950 353.17$     51.47$    
ATL-LGA 50,207$     70,232$            205,080$            27,704$  353,222$   835 423.02$     
LGA-ATL 51,346$     106,689$          151,247$            17,844$  327,126$   845 387.13$     35.89$    
LGA-ORD 30,354$     111,835$          187,679$            13,913$  343,781$   892 385.41$     
ORD-LGA 24,352$     59,329$            148,979$            13,082$  245,741$   890 276.11$     109.29$  
JFK-ANC 23,588$     45,255$            265,200$            970$        335,013$   223 1,502.30$ 
ANC-JFK 6,733$        6,783$              147,021$            14,380$  174,917$   234 747.51$     754.79$  
JFK-SFO 27,699$     125,408$          156,253$            10,428$  319,788$   562 569.02$     
SFO-JFK 21,095$     29,069$            201,833$            20,438$  272,435$   589 462.54$     106.48$  
ATL-EWR 55,128$     51,721$            145,523$            6,169$    258,541$   676 382.46$     
EWR-ATL 40,611$     56,130$            84,972$              11,654$  193,366$   682 283.53$     98.93$    
SFO-LAX 27,771$     29,325$            175,898$            25,051$  258,045$   1049 245.99$     
LAX-SFO 47,983$     41,140$            133,639$            10,419$  233,182$   1067 218.54$     27.45$    
ATL-PHL 35,457$     35,830$            174,688$            6,140$    252,115$   635 397.03$     
PHL-ATL 29,554$     55,115$            75,821$              11,129$  171,619$   632 271.55$     125.48$  
LAX-OAK 11,536$     11,823$            216,957$            7,632$    247,948$   883 280.80$     
OAK-LAX 11,007$     14,764$            181,690$            8,932$    216,394$   885 244.51$     36.29$    
MCO-PHL 23,899$     24,717$            189,311$            9,549$    247,476$   598 413.84$     
PHL-MCO 28,373$     44,707$            91,317$              6,824$    171,220$   597 286.80$     127.04$  
Airport Gate Delay Taxi out Delay Airborne Delay Taxi in Delay Total Delay # Flights $ per flight Total Delay $ per min delay per flight
DFW 959,984$     881,398$          2,674,620$        213,078$      4,729,080$ 26,013  181.80$     715,435      6.61$      27.50                   
JFK 701,569$     1,819,817$      1,929,810$        132,221$      4,583,418$ 12,594  363.94$     675,469      6.79$      53.63                   
PHL 505,110$     1,006,537$      2,147,482$        127,386$      3,786,516$ 17,089  221.58$     585,909      6.46$      34.29                   
LGA 409,444$     1,035,883$      1,895,051$        119,169$      3,459,548$ 14,760  234.39$     533,884      6.48$      36.17                   
EWR 594,332$     1,093,532$      1,296,275$        115,202$      3,099,341$ 13,075  237.04$     535,720      5.79$      40.97                   
BOS 416,529$     475,273$          2,035,500$        147,260$      3,074,561$ 11,680  263.23$     367,926      8.36$      31.50                   
SFO 262,320$     328,623$          1,933,248$        151,861$      2,676,051$ 12,782  209.36$     280,038      9.56$      21.91                   
DCA 214,479$     322,695$          1,838,970$        90,158$         2,466,301$ 11,087  222.45$     266,938      9.24$      24.08                   
IAD 244,891$     356,161$          1,575,527$        87,773$         2,264,352$ 11,246  201.35$     292,379      7.74$      26.00                   
BWI 264,315$     264,049$          1,585,187$        99,819$         2,213,370$ 10,248  215.98$     242,499      9.13$      23.66                   
OAK 96,497$       95,769$            1,227,613$        64,249$         1,484,127$ 6,875    215.87$     125,457      11.83$    18.25                   
SJC 66,585$       44,986$            1,049,198$        55,618$         1,216,387$ 5,843    208.18$     89,718        13.56$    15.35                   
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Conclusions  
 
From the analysis, the following conclusions are made: 
 
 The cost factors from the EC report and costs as reported by US carriers in BTS P52 database follow 
similar trends. Thus, the general approach taken by EuroControl can be applied, with minor 
modifications, to compute the cost of delays for US flights 
 The appropriate multipliers for crew and maintenance costs are determined that, when combined with 
the other factors, produced multipliers close to those reported in the EC report.  
 Airborne delays, when incurred, dominate ground delay costs, so airlines are economically 
encouraged to maximize ground delay costs.  
 Newer more fuel efficient aircraft provide airlines with the least delay costs. 
 The cost of delay is not proportional to the flights flown.  One reason for this non-intuitive result is 
that when a flight is cancelled, it is recorded as having zero delay.  Future research will address how 
to cost cancelled flights.  
 
The calculations of the cost of delayed flights (ignoring all cancelled flights) total $63.8M for July 2007. 
Many economic modeling and analysis efforts require a good understanding of the costs that an airline 
will incur when it experiences delays at the gate, while taxiing or while en-route.  This paper has 
presented a relatively straightforward mechanism for calculating such costs and for predicting how such 
costs are likely to increase when there is a change in fuel costs, aircraft type, or when some other cost 
might be added to the overall cost structure.   It is informative in explaining why airlines are currently 
down-gauging the aircraft size: the newer regional jets are more fuel efficient and airborne fuel costs 
dominate the overall cost.  Fuel costs, coupled with the fact that the airlines can offer increased frequency 
and observe higher load factors, encourage airlines to down-guage.  Although such policies are favored 
by the industry, they result in less efficient use of both the airspace and airport runways.  
 
 
Future Work  
 
Future analysis will both expand and apply this model in a variety of efforts currently underway: 
 
A mechanism for including the costs of cancellations in the overall cost calculations needs to be  
developed. The research of Xiong [2010], Wang, et al. [2006], Rupp [2005], Sherry [2010] and Bratu & 
Barnhart [2005] will assist in this effort. 
 
Sensitivity analysis needs to be done on the model to determine how robust it is to significant cost 
changes in fuel or crew, and/or changes in aircraft usage.  Having separated the cost factors into their 
component parts, alternative cost factors can be applied to a variety of aircraft types not studied in the EC 
model.  Initial work in this direction is reported in Kara et al. [2010]. 
 
Analysis, based on these costs, needs to be done to predict which flights are most likely to be cancelled or 
delayed when weather conditions result in the initiation of a Ground Delay Program.  
 
The delay costs as provided in the above study are needed to evaluate savings to airlines of possible 
changes to ground delay program rules that use market-based mechanisms to determine departure order.  
See Gao et. al. [2010] for more on this effort. 
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The delay costs as provided in the above study need to be included as part of a larger equilibrium model 
that predicts the actions of airlines under various policy decisions.  See Ferguson et. al. [2010] for more 
on this effort.  
 
These delay costs will be used as a tool in a congestion-pricing model to determine the flights that are 
most likely to be cancelled first when capacity at an airport is reduced.  An understanding of airline 
behavior (based on their cost structure and network configuration) is necessary when attempting to 
determine the prices that a regulator would need to charge in order  to have supply approximately equal 
demand when congestion pricing is imposed at an airport.  
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